| The dissertation comprises a theoretical and empirical examination of policy networks from a transaction cost perspective. I argue that in an exchange environment characterized by positive transaction costs, intendedly rational actors will be forced to govern both formal and informal contractual relations against potential opportunism. In the context of competitive electoral systems, the legislator's general problem can thus be viewed as one of designing appropriate governance mechanisms for the procurement of vote-productive policy resources used to make expected vote maximizing public policy.;I develop a transaction cost theory of policy networks against this general backdrop in three main parts. First, I advance a comparative investigation of network organization to market and hierarchical forms in which the policy network emerges as an endogenous choice for informal contractual governance in policy-making. Second, I investigate a set of exogenous conditions under which the policy network can be viewed as the more likely organizational choice when compared to market or hierarchy. And third, I present a model of three ideal-type policy network forms—the direct, indirect and complex—in which network structure is argued to affect both the cost of self-enforcing exchange between the legislator and private actor(s), and the distribution of rent.;The theory is also applied empirically to data gathered from the Lobbyists Registration Act, demonstrating that the choice of policy network is affected by policy field-type, private actor lobbying behaviour, and legislator funding of private groups. In addition, by tracing the organizational response to the licensing of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST) in Canada, including the emergence of a complex-type policy network, I illustrate that the theory can be applied successfully to real policy cases. |
