| This dissertation explores the politics, policy, practice and performance of chemical industry self-regulation. Interestingly, there exists a general presumption that only government has the tools and the incentives to clean up the environment and ensure a healthy and safe workplace. Trade association self-regulation is often thought to amount to little more than symbolic politics that may undermine the authority, legitimacy, and effectiveness of government or involve an anti-competitive conspiracy. However, this doctoral research suggests the chemical industry has managed to develop self-regulatory institutions that serve as important and necessary complements to government regulation. They enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of performance improvements and public responsiveness within the industry; they facilitate intra-industry learning; they promote competition between companies for health, safety and environmental performance improvements; and they establish an ethical framework for its efforts.; I approach this topic from the perspective of collective action theory. Voluntary regulation has presented the chemical industry with several collective action problems including developing self-regulatory institutions, maintaining a credible commitment to their rules, and ensuring a high degree of monitoring and sanctioning of companies for compliance. My approach to these issues has been framed in terms of and is informed by the many legal constraints established by antitrust and liability law and the imperatives of member retention in the industry association. This dissertation examines how and to what extent these obstacles have been successfully overcome through selective incentives, coercion, shared norms, reciprocity, communication, education and persuasion. It assesses the managerial and competitive impact of chemical industry self-regulation and its implications for public administration and environmental policy. The research has involved extensive, qualitative, in-person interviewing with key chemical industry executives, plant managers, environmental groups, and regulatory officials. |
