| In this dissertation, I examine how elected officials attempt to address the matter of democratic accountability in policy systems where delegation of authority problems are acute. Because elected officials face constraints in their ability to monitor and influence the bureaucratic implementation of policy goals, it has been argued that designing a policy's administrative structure in particular ways can predispose outcomes and afford elected officials greater policy influence. While a compelling theoretic argument, its various propositions have been infrequently tested empirically.; I argue that a useful way to test the basic propositions of this line of argument is to examine interest group organizations' activities in a given policy domain. Interest groups are understood to be important to resolving certain problems associated with delegation, such as bureaucratic and legislative drift. The research question posited here is whether the administrative features of a policy domain systematically relate to interest group policy participation activities.; I answer the question by studying state-level interest groups in the area of air quality regulation. This affords variance in administrative structure as well as other relevant factors. A survey of nearly 250 interest groups in ten states examined three specific areas: relative access in the policy process, interest group monitoring activities, and group choices of participation tactics. The findings here provide preliminary support for the importance of structure in shaping how interests are represented in the policy process. |
