The politics of industrial bargaining: The restructuring of state-owned enterprises in the People's Republic of China, 1978-1995

Why do some industrial actors do a better job of influencing state policy toward their firms than others? I attempt to answer this question by applying a general political economy framework using the literatures of industrial organization theory and non-cooperative game theoretic approaches to bargaining theory. I argue that the nature of the industrial market structure, which is a reflection of the organization and deployment of industrial assets, plays an important role in determining the bargaining power of actors and, consequently, their ability to influence state-industrial policy making.; While drawing on data from the developing world at large, I focus on state-industrial policy making in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the People's Republic of China (PRC) during the reform period; namely, from the time of Deng Xiaoping's rise to power in 1978 to the culmination of the 8{dollar}sp{lcub}rm th{rcub}{dollar} Five-Year Plan (FYP) in 1995. Specifically, I examine bargaining issues in the state sectors in China of coal, oil, steel and textiles. I find that some industrial actors in the PRC, notably those in highly asset specific firms that operate in highly concentrated industrial market structures, possess high degrees of bargaining power in comparison to other industrial actors. These industrial actors are thus able to influencing economic restructuring policies in their SOEs to a high degree. Ultimately, given the bargaining power of some industrial actors, I argue that the term "state-owned enterprise" is misleading in some cases. Instead, it is more accurate to use the term of "enterprise-owned state."...