The effects of organizational commitment and expected outcomes on the motivation to share discretionary information in a collaborative database: Communication dilemmas and other serious games

Shared databases in organizations can serve as efficient, flexible communication media. But discretionary information—that information provided on a voluntary basis—tends to be under-supplied. Database users who are not individually assured of rewards for contributing information typically face a communication dilemma: Their collective interests bid them to share information while myopic self-interest discourages them from contributing. Potential costs to an organization are substantial. It was proposed that database users do share discretionary information to benefit the whole organization under certain conditions. An expectancy model was developed to predict the motivation of organizational members in general to contribute discretionary information to a shared database.; Theoretical analysis focused first on how identification among participants in a collective action promotes collective success. It was argued that similar beneficial effects should be observed for organizational commitment. The analysis turned nod to the dual importance of communication as a facilitator of collective action as well as a collective action in its own right. In addition, the analysis examined communicative public goods, the variety of communication system the incorporate shared databases, and the different types of interdependence found among database users.; The hypothesized model contained four components: (1) organizational commitment; (2) the belief that sharing information will produce organizational gain (organizational instrumentality); (3) the belief that the database can be used to reach other people (connective efficacy ); and (4) the belief that database users will value contributed information (information self-efficacy). Research questions addressed the motivational effects of private gains expected from collective database use, and selective incentives. A survey was designed and administered to members of an intact work team (N = 28). The hypothesized model's prediction of contributor motivation was highly significant. Each of the model's components contributed significantly except for information self-efficacy. No effects were found for private gains or selective incentives. Implications for theory and practice were discussed. The motivation model could be extended to predict information sharing by means of any communication medium.