Minimalistic virtue ethics: Theory for moral education

In this dissertation, I present an outline of a comprehensive theory of moral education through a minimalistic version of virtue ethics. I examine the educational aspects of virtue ethics and suggest minimalistic virtue ethics as an educational theory as well as a moral theory.; Educational considerations are an integral part of virtue ethics. Unlike in other moral theories, the education of moral agents is essentially a theoretical component of virtue ethics. The key concepts of ‘virtue’ and ‘character’ can only be understood through the understanding of their cultivation, which constitutes a significant part of the education of a moral agent.; The most influential systematic account of virtue ethics appears in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. The theory that I propose in this dissertation owes much to Aristotle, but it differs from Aristotle's ethics on several points. This version of virtue ethics is minimalistic both in the number of virtues it acknowledges and in the worldview it tents. Minimalistic ethics is a naturalistic theory, that is to say, it is based on certain human psychological qualities, which dictate certain moral sentiments. As such, minimalistic ethics recognizes human desire for personal freedom. Consequently, minimalistic ethics requires only minimal restriction on human behavior, only to the extent necessary to prevent harm. Minimalistic ethics concentrates on the negative side of morality, the side that prohibits certain actions, without presenting any positive demands. In this dissertation I argue that such a model is plausible both as a moral and as an educational theory.; The proposed version of virtue ethics concentrates on the three virtues of non-malevolence, fairness, and temperance. Non-malevolence and fairness are the dispositions that will prevent the moral agent from inflicting unnecessary harm (I discuss briefly the concept of ‘unnecessary harm’) and from taking advantage of another (I distinguish between fairness and justice in the dissertation, arguing that fairness is a personal characteristic in a way justice is not). Temperance, here, is taken to mean temperance in the execution of the virtues of non-malevolence and fairness, rather then self-inflicted limitation of the pursuit of pleasure. In minimalistic virtue ethics temperance plays the role of a balancer of non-malevolence and fairness. The three virtues interact and together contribute to the development of the moral character of the moral agent.