United States policy towards partition: The U.S. approach to secessionist or irredentist movements in Ethiopia, Bosnia and Iraq

The dissertation examines U.S. policy towards partition in the 1990s. Partition is defined as the division of a sovereign state into one or more sovereign states, representing the successful culmination of one or more secessionist or irredentist movements. The author utilizes the "focused comparison" comparative case study method to measure the significance of four variables in determining the outcome of U.S. policy supporting or not supporting partition. The variables include: the position of allies and/or the dominant regional power, concern that conflict will renew or expand, concern regarding a demonstration effect and the role of international or domestic ethnic lobby groups. Eight hypotheses, or propositions, represent correlations between these variables and the two outcomes. These propositions are measured against the U.S. policy record in three cases---Ethiopia in 1991--1993, Iraq in 1991, and Bosnia-Hercegovina from 1992--95.;The dissertation reveals that of the four variables only two demonstrate strong relevance to U.S. policy regarding partition. In all three cases there is a demonstrated relationship between the fear of renewed or expanded conflict and U.S. policy. In the case of Bosnia and Iraq it works to deny the secessionists their goals---U.S. policy does not support the partition of the states. In Ethiopia the fear of continued conflict operates to support the development of a policy that is positively-oriented towards partition. The second most influential variable is the position of allies and/or the dominant regional state. The proposition measuring this variable is supported in two cases---in Iraq, and weakly, in Ethiopia. The impact of a feared demonstration effect is weakly supported in two cases. The study indicates that it is interconnected with the fear of continued conflict, and therefore of little explanatory value. Finally, the role of ethnic lobby groups had no significant impact on U.S. policy in any of the cases. In short, the dissertation provides further evidence that U.S. policy regarding partition is driven mainly by geostrategic concerns. Partition will be opposed if the U.S. government assumes that it will lead to more conflict, and accepted if it is militarily sustainable and likely to end conflict. De facto partition, in contrast, is deemed acceptable, even if unpalatable.