| Intellectual property rights are created by the interaction of right-seeking by individuals and firms and the right-granting role of the state. However, coercive diplomacy literature characterizes the development of intellectual property institutions as resulting from compliance with international norms, as enforced by powerful states, and the diffusion of ideas through complex interdependence fostered by international institutions. I demonstrate the significance of right-seeking behavior and subsequent effective grants of intellectual property rights in the United States, Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, and the People's Republic of China from 1975 through 1990—the period which is the focus of coercive diplomacy theorists regarding diplomatic activity by the U.S. In each case, right seeking and granting increased prior to the deployment of diplomatic pressure and the resolution of the disputes.; The theoretical implication for the comparative analysis of intellectual property development is that domestic demand is the dominant causal factor, while the effectiveness of diplomacy is contingent on economic development. The policy implication is that fostering economic and technological development is more effective than the application of external diplomatic pressure on developing states. |
