The effect of federalism on intergroup relations in multiethnic states: Evidence from Nigeria and Ethiopia, 1960--1998

This dissertation seeks a better understanding of the operation and effects of federalism on intergroup relations in multiethnic states in a 'developing' context. It hopes to contribute to the debates on decentralization, devolution and state building. Though formally diverse, Nigeria (1960 to 1998 intermittently) and Ethiopia (1991 to 1998) are both 'federations of many nations.' They provide the best evidence available on the phenomenon of 'horizontal federalism' where the federal state becomes a broker institution between major ethnolinguistic groups.; The study focuses on three core issue areas of intergroup contention and conflict. These are the distribution of territory (internal units), the organization of fiscal relations (the interregional collection and allocation of revenues), and the regulation of group access to state-brokered opportunity and representation (in higher education, public sector employment and national decision making). Horowitz (1985) argued that the success of federalism as conflict-management depends on its ability to (1) disperse conflict by proliferating decision making; (2) to deemphasize intergroup conflict by emphasizing intragroup conflict; (3) to promote intergroup cooperation; (4) to encourage non ethnic alignment; and (5) to reduce intergroup disparities (Horowitz, 1985). The study takes up these five mechanisms in each issue area across the two cases.; The data suggests that federalism is better understood as an instrument of limited utility rather than a panacea for societies in conflict. With regards to intergroup relations it has played a largely mitigating role but has also produced substantial aggravation in particular instances. It has produced a reality of territorial fragmentation in Nigeria. Repeated boundary adjustments in both states produced substantial conflict on the ground and sharpened the fault lines of identity. Federal fiscal dominance (a vertical fiscal imbalance) in both cases has ensured the continued aggregation of conflict toward the center rather than its dispersal and undermined political devolution. While national wealth appeared to provide the supporting platform for federalism, regionally concentrated wealth (particularly of a mineral nature) threatened it. Finally, while preferential policies were justified as necessary to redress existing imbalances in particular functional areas, they induced centrifugal tendencies, negatively affected intergroup relations and decreased professional and geographic mobility.