The radicalization of a phenomenological theory of meaning: From Husserl, through Heidegger, to Levinas

I understand these three thinkers in their analyses of meaning to be going progressively deeper into the foundations of conscious experience. In each case, the thinker is replying to earlier work. Fundamental to each objection is the claim that the earlier position has taken to be foundational some aspect of consciousness that is not. The objector elucidates a deeper foundation, making his theory more true to human experience.;Husserl argues against positions which understand knowledge in terms of cause and effect. These views actually undermine rather than explain knowledge. Husserl's discovery of the intentional quality of consciousness creates new possibilities of inquiry. But Husserl seeks to reassert the validity of rational thought and the sciences. This commitment leads him to a pattern of reflective philosophy which puts theoretical understanding at the foundation of human experience.;Heidegger appropriates the concept of intentionality and applies it in a revolutionary way. More faithful to reflection on human experience than Husserl, he characterizes intentional consciousness not as fundamentally rational, but as fundamentally situated in the world and involved with projects. Theoretical understanding is founded on practical understanding and activity. This changes the problem from one of knowing to one of being.;Levinas analyzes structures of consciousness which precede and found the experience of the world. Alone, consciousness has the resources to conceive a world, but not to conceive objective meaning. For this, it requires a relation directly to another consciousness. Both activity and theory are founded on a fundamental relation. Objective understanding, as a fundamentally relational endeavor, does not partake of a final perfection. I contend Levinas is most faithful of all to the structure of experience.;I address each thinker's position on meaning in terms of four pertinent sub-topics: (1) the phenomenological nature of an object of knowledge, (2) the constitution of truth for the knowing being, (3) the nature of conscious being that is doing the knowing, and (4) the significance for conscious being of other conscious beings.