| This is a study of the tripartite relations between North Korea, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union during the years of 1949 and 1950. It focuses on contacts between the leaders of the three countries, and posits three basic questions: Why did war break out in Korea in June 1950? Why did the Chinese intervene in the war four months later? And what are the connections between these two events? As regards the outbreak of the war, this study investigates the basic causes of conflict, the manner in which the Communists side, especially the Soviet Union and North Korea, prepared for the initial invasion, and the motives of those who started the war. It also examines the Chinese contribution to the outbreak of the war, especially in respect to relations between Beijing and Pyongyang in 1949 and early 1950, highlighted by Kim Il-song's two visits to Beijing. This study regards Mao's visit to Moscow at the end of 1950 as a critical event, the ramifications of which led to Stalin's decision to give the go-ahead for war in Korea. In respect to the Chinese intervention, this study explores North Korea's relations with the Chinese Communist Party, particularly with the regional political authorities in Manchuria during the period of the Chinese Civil War when the two established a precedence for military cooperation between them. It scrutinizes the Chinese response to the first four months of the war and attempts to analyze the reasons for the Chinese decision to intervene, a decision influenced in part by pressure from Stalin and requests for assistance from North Korea. |
