Process, politics and institutions: Three essays in formal theory on comparative institution

The first essay is concerned with the effects of executive veto powers and compares two types of veto powers, the line-item veto and the package veto, when the legislature is concerned with both public and private goods. I show that the different veto powers lead to different political strategies and, consequently, different policy outcomes. The policy outcomes do not only differ in terms of spending but also in terms of the division of total spending on public and private goods and therefore raise concerns about efficiency and welfare-consequences.;The second essay is on political competition, more specifically on run-off elections under majority rule where candidates face no thresholds to entry in subsequent ballots. The model examines how coordination takes place under perfect information. I characterize and solve for all pure strategy equilibria of the game, and for mixed strategy equilibria in three-candidate run-offs. The framework I adopt here can also be applied to the study of primaries and polling in which similar sorts of coordination take place.;In the final essay I look at party cohesion and dissent in parliamentary systems from an informational perspective. Why dissent occurs in parliamentary systems is in some ways a dilemma as in many parliamentary systems the legislators rely on their party label for reelection and the party's reputation for cohesion has been documented to be a valuable electoral asset. Hence, both the individual legislator and the party suffer if dissent occurs. The explanation offered here focuses on informational gains via dissent. It is assumed that each legislator has better knowledge of his constituency's preferences than the Cabinet. By dissenting the legislator can credibly, albeit not without cost, signal information about his constituency to the Cabinet. Dissent can thus serve to better calibrate the Cabinet's policies with the electorate's preferences. The likelihood of dissent is also related to the legislators' electoral strength and the cost of dissent.