| Starting with the question of why policy changes occur when there are no changes to the underlying conditions, this dissertation offers a solution that combines rational choice and cognitive psychology. Applying prospect theory to the question of why policy changes when the conditions do not, this study develops a theory of framing. Starting with a classic expression of expected utility, the result is an explanation of the process by which reframing a problem results in changes in risk attitudes. Because foreign policy decisions occur in uncertain environments, decision makers rely on two sets of assumptions and belief sets. Second-order assumptions result in a worldview that serves as an ordering device when actors are initially presented with a decision situation. First-order assumptions are context oriented and are used by the decision maker to form a belief set that reflects beliefs about future outcomes of courses of action. By emphasizing elements of information after the initial presentation one can shift the belief set about future outcomes from a gain domain to a loss domain. With this shift, the expectation that any decision will have a positive value becomes greater than the expectation that it will have a negative value. The theory's external validity is demonstrated by using the U.S. reversal of policy and decision to deploy troops to Bosnia. The theory provides additional understanding to the areas of brinkmanship, diversionary wars, and security dilemmas. |
