Danger and opportunity: Eisenhower, Churchill, and the Soviet Union after Stalin, 1953 (Soviet Union, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Sir Winston Churchill, Great Britain)

Could the Cold War have ended forty years earlier? This dissertation argues that the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953 offered the first opportunity to change the direction of the Cold War. Based on research in Russian, British, and American archives, this study examines the three major powers in the events after Stalin's death—the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States—and investigates why this opportunity was lost.; After Stalin's death, a striking fluidity infused the seemingly permanent and stalemated Cold War. In foreign affairs, Stalin's successors, led by Georgii Malenkov and Lavrentii Beria, launched a “peace offensive” to reduce tensions and the risk of nuclear war. By June, they wanted to reunify Germany, and apparently seemed willing to accept a neutral, but capitalist German state.; US President Dwight Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill believed détente now seemed possible, and agreed that lasting peace required some transformation of the Soviet system. Because they approached international relations differently—Eisenhower blended Wilsonian thought with a deep suspicion of communism, while Churchill's views were grounded in realpolitik tempered by principled liberalism—they disagreed on how to secure peace. For Eisenhower, transformation of the Soviet system through “liberation” or economic improvement had to come first. For Churchill, détente and a modus vivendi had to be established first, then a slow transformation of the Soviet system through personal contacts, trade, and science was possible. Eisenhower put forward his plan in his April “Chance for Peace” speech, while Churchill issued his plan as a corrective to Eisenhower's in a speech in May. The two men were to meet in June to discuss their ideas.; Three events in June 1953 diminished the chance for an early détente. The East German uprising demonstrated that Soviet relinquishment of the GDR would not just be a negotiation, but a real, and unacceptable, coup for the West. Beria's removal from power weakened the position and policies of Malenkov. Finally, Churchill's stroke prevented him from meeting with Eisenhower, eliminating the chance to put Western policy on a more realistic and suitable track to obtain détente.