| The core of classical theism is the belief that an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being—God—exists. Many have urged that belief in God is irrational or philosophically untenable, since theism is disconfirmed by the presence of evil in the world. Efforts to make good this claim are called arguments from evil. I examine the best contemporary arguments from evil, and I conclude that while they may justify disbelief in God, they do not show that theistic belief is irrational or philosophically untenable.; Implicitly or explicitly, arguments from evil depend on comparisons between the actual world and alternative possible worlds that an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good creator could have made actual. I argue that possible worlds have axiological status, and, after considering some good making and bad-making characteristics of worlds, I conclude that either there are infinitely many axiologically-unsurpassable worlds that an omnipotent being would have the power to actualize, or else there are no such worlds.; On each view, arguments from evil take a common form. They typically urge that if God exists, the actual world lacks gratuitous evil: evil which (roughly) serves no outweighing or justifying good. They next suggest that since the actual world likely features gratuitous evil, probably, God does not exist. Such arguments can succeed only if God and gratuitous evil are logically incompatible, but this has been denied. I examine and reject the most influential contemporary such denial, and I endorse the view that God and gratuitous evil are logically incompatible.; If the actual world features gratuitous evil, then, theism is disconfirmed. Efforts to disconfirm theism generally turn on one of these inferences: (1) evil E appears to be gratuitous; therefore, probably, evil E is gratuitous; and (2) we know of no outweighing good served by E; therefore, probably, there is no such good Both are controversial. After considering numerous features of our epistemic situation with respect to these inferences, I conclude that entitlement to these moves is subject- and context-specific. I maintain that while one may be so entitled, theists may be rational in resisting these inferences, and (hence) the atheistic conclusion they suggest. |
