| This work seeks to answer the question of how God can have comprehensive knowledge of the future, including future creaturely actions, without destroying the freedom of those agents. After a survey of the various competing approaches to answering the problem, the doctrine of divine middle knowledge is thought to be the most promising approach and therefore, this theory is defended against its contemporary detractors.;The history of Molinism and its contemporary formulations are examined. It is then noted that the doctrine is not without its critics. The two main objections to the theory, the grounding objection to the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom and the circularity objection, are studied in chapters four and five. It is concluded that the grounding objection has not been adequately answered by contemporary Molinists, and the circularity objection reduces to a form of the grounding objection. Thus, the grounding objection must be answered.;It is argued that the doctrine of supercomprehension, which Molina set forth as an explanation of how God can know counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, can serve to answer the grounding objection. Counterfactuals are grounded in God---in the divine ideas of creaturely wills as they pre-exist in the divine essence. An examination of Thomas Aquinas' metaphysic enables this approach without making counterfactuals necessary. Thus, the belief that all truth is God's truth is effectively preserved, while the contingency of counterfactuals remains unscathed. |
