| My research focuses on models of procedural choice. First proposed by Simon [1955], the common feature of these models is that the decision-maker chooses by following a simple heuristic rather than maximizing a preference. A common feature of these models is that choice is guided by features of the choice environment or constrained by limitations of the decision-maker.;1. Sequential search and choice from lists: Decision-makers frequently encounter choice alternatives presented in the form of a list. Evidence shows that decision-making in the list environment is influenced by the order of the alternatives. The prevailing view in psychology and marketing is that these order effects in choice result from cognitive bias. In this paper, I offer a standard economic rationale for order effects by modelling choice from lists as a process of sequential search.;The axiomatic characterization of the model provides choice-theoretic foundations for sequential search and recall. The list-structure of the environment permits a natural definition of search and preference in terms of choice. For a decision-maker whose behavior can be represented as the outcome of sequential search, the search strategy can be determined uniquely.;2. Choice by tournament: Trees figure as decision-making tools in a variety of contexts ranging from collective choice to individual decision-making. In this paper, I study a general model of choice where the decision-maker uses a binary tree (or tournament) to decide. Informally, these tournament procedures extend the logic of knockout tournaments frequently used in sports competitions.;In terms of choice behavior, the model can be succinctly characterized by weakening Plott's Path Independence. In the special case where every item appears exactly once, the range of possible tree-representations consistent with behavior is narrowly determined by choice from menus of two and three alternatives.;3. Implementation by agenda voting: Agenda voting occurs in a variety of different contexts. This paper characterizes the class of social choice functions that can be implemented by sophisticated voting on an agenda under the assumption of complete information. The main result shows that a simple pairwise condition is necessary and sufficient for implementation by agenda voting.;Because this condition is relatively weak, a broad range of selections from the Condorcet set can be implemented. Since it only involves pairs of majority relations that are globally similar, the condition has the added virtue of being easy to check. |
