From bullets to ballots: The political transformation of violent opposition movements

When and why do violent opposition movements undergo political transformations? The key argument that I advance is that in order to understand why some violent opposition movements abandon an armed strategy and even actively join institutionalized politics, we must account for the potential conflicts of interests within violent opposition movements themselves. The possibility for division and conflict within a violent opposition movement affects whether it politically transforms itself in two, key ways: First, within-movement conflict influences the ability of that movement to effectively change its strategy in light of structural conditions, including economic prospects, the extent that the government engages in different types of repression of the opposition population, and whether the government is willing to engage in negotiations that lead to a political settlement. Put simply, the potential for intra-movement conflict affects an insurgency's strategic adaptability to changes in economic and political circumstances. Second, the possible divisions within a violent opposition movement affect its credibility during negotiations with the government over prospective settlements. That is, whether and to what degree a government is willing to extend concessions in any peace deal depends on the extent to which the leadership of an opposition movement can control its rank and file membership. In order to evaluate my claims, I focus on the case of Northern Ireland. I build on extensive, original fieldwork and interviews with paramilitaries, high-level government negotiators, and noncombatants as well as a new, spatial dataset on economic conditions, repressive dynamics, and insurgent violence at various geographic aggregations over time. I find support for my key theoretical claims and conclude that the fate of violent opposition movements -- while apparently broad conflicts involving like-minded individuals -- is in fact driven primarily by individual-level and local factors.