The political moderation model of violent political conflict: The impact of political opportunity structures on the relationship between economic inequality and violent political conflic

Violent political conflict has typically been studied from either an economic discontent or a political opportunity framework. This study proposes a political moderation model, which hypothesizes that the production of grievances due to economic inequality varies systematically and interacts with the political opportunity structure to generate violent political conflict. Using multiple regression analysis, this cross-national research examines the interaction between economic inequality and political opportunities, as well as their direct effects on political violence. The research findings provide support for the political moderation model propositions that political opportunity structures moderate the relationship between economic inequality and violent political conflict. Specifically, the positive impact of income inequality and separatist potential on political violence are enhanced in weak states. The impact of class exploitation on violent political conflict is moderated by regime structure and political institutionalization. The findings suggest that political opportunity structures may operate in different ways in challenges rooted in different types of economic inequality.