Integrity, identity, and why moral exemplars do what is right

In Chapter 1, I distill a basic notion of integrity from existing discussions to answer the question, "What is integrity?". My analysis provides a "bare bones" account that captures the central features of integrity without addressing its moral or immoral content. The identity account of integrity I present requires a person of integrity to have coherent commitments that constitute her identity as well as the determination to actualize them.;In Chapter 2 I answer the question, "Is integrity a moral concept?" I start by reviewing recent attempts to resolve a dilemma facing all integrity accounts. The first horn of the dilemma is the intuition problem which is that it seems that both tyrants and heroes could have some kind of integrity. The second horn is the moral integrity problem which is that integrity is commonly regarded as a moral concept that cannot apply to tyrants. Any optimal account of integrity should explain our diverging intuitions about integrity while recognizing integrity as a moral concept. I resolve the dilemma by first making a distinction between substantive integrity and formal integrity. When I say, "Mary is a person of integrity," most speakers presuppose that she is morally trustworthy. When I say that a tyrant has integrity, however, I must qualify my statement by pointing to some strongly held non-moral commitments that explain my attribution. I argue that substantive integrity refers to a person who has a whole and coherent identity that is morally uncorrupted, while formal integrity refers to a person who merely has a whole and coherent identity. In the remainder of Chapter 2, I develop a moral identity account of integrity that resolves the dilemma by accounting for the similarities and differences between tyrants and heroes as well as explaining the moral content of integrity.;In Chapter 3 I answer the question "Is integrity a virtue?" by addressing claims that integrity is not a virtue or that it is merely the expression of other virtues. Against these positions I argue that integrity is a virtue, namely the disposition to "be true" to oneself by maintaining a coherent self. I first build on the moral identity account to explain what constitutes a coherent "self." I then explain how a person of integrity organizes her commitments according to her most important ends and how a desire for self-consistency motivates her to fulfill her commitments. This should suffice to show that integrity is a virtue. But my account faces questions about how the person of integrity maintains coherence, and I end Chapter 3 by responding to four such questions. (1) Can "honest thieves" have substantive integrity? (2) Can a person of substantive integrity ever lie in order to actualize another virtue? (3) Can a person of substantive integrity alter or change her identity and still have integrity? (4) Can two people have opposed moral beliefs and both have substantive integrity?;In Chapter 4 I respond to an important empirical objection to the moral identity account of integrity. John Doris and Gilbert Harman argue that consistency of character is doubtful because situational factors often overwhelm a person's moral identity. The purpose of this chapter is not to contradict the findings of the social psychology experiments presented in defense of their position, but rather to show that the moral identity account of integrity can better explain their findings. I argue that integrity based on a person's moral identity is not as situationally flexible as Doris and Harman claim. Recent research on how a person's moral commitments can become more or less accessible to her working memory demonstrates that a person's moral identity can actually mediate behavior across situations.;In Chapter 5 I take up another empirical challenge to integrity as a moral virtue. David Luban claims that the quest for integrity is dangerous for two reasons. First, in our quest to maintain harmony between our beliefs and conduct, we tend to change our moral principles to justify our immoral behavior. Second, we also tend to rationalize our immoral behaviors because we want to appear upright to ourselves and others. Against Luban's position, I argue that what he labels a quest for integrity is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce the moral corruption and rationalization that he fears. A person may rationalize her conduct in a quest for achievement and wealth, but rarely would she do so in a quest for substantive integrity. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)...