Indications: Heidegger and Levinas on language and ethos after Husserl

Indications traces the provenance of two unusual forms of expression in philosophy---Heidegger's formale Anzeige and Levinas's se dedire---and shows that both lead back to a surprising common source: Husserl's concern with properly describing the structures of intentionality. As a genealogy of these two methodological strategies, this is also an examination of two unique ways of understanding language, both of which can be characterized as anti-instrumental.;This work also points out that Heidegger and Levinas share one other thing in common. Both of them understand language to be intimately tied together with the ethical situation of the human being. Heidegger characterizes language as part of the relation between man and being, thus as part of his ethos, while Levinas calls the encounter with the other person that founds interpersonal responsibility the first event of signification. Insofar as their similar understanding of language is imbricated with problems specific to their respective methodologies, it can also be understood as a reaction to Husserl's claim about the ethical duty of philosophy.;The goal of this study is not only to effect a historical overview of two methodologies, but to point toward the questions a better understanding of these raise. Two explicitly indicative modes of expression provide much to be considered when examining the ostensible content of each thinker. On another level, the question of indication offers much to think about the very nature of language in its relation to conceptuality. This is not immaterial to the realms of law, justice, or indeed ethics.