| The dissertation defends the idea that legal systems determine the content of moral duties in complex societies. In the first chapter, it suggests that Hart's theory of rules can be understood as an epistemic theory; namely, as a theory that does not pretend to answer the problem of what a rule is, but what are the conditions required to state that a group holds a rule. In the second chapter, I claim that some important criticisms against Hart's theory can be responded if we pay attention to the nature of his theory of rules. I also discuss the idea that morality is required to determine the validity of some legal norms. Based on my interpretation of the practice theory of rules, I try to reconcile the idea that moral arguments are used to explain why principles are part of legal systems in virtue of their moral value, with the idea that lawyers and attorneys clearly use immoral rules to justify their decisions and guide their actions. Once I have explained that Hart's theory of rules is the best means for recognizing the valid rules in a legal system, I show the importance of law for solving coordination problems. I focus on the idea that legal systems are provided with publicity devices; namely, provisions which objective is to inform people which are the valid rules of a community. Given that the solution of some coordination problems is essential to protect some important moral values—life and human integrity, for instance—it seems that the content of some of our moral obligations is determined by the law. |
