| This dissertation explores the mind of war as studied through the testimony of selected World War II armed forces personnel. Their thoughts, emotions, and reactions are measured against accepted historical wartime scholarship. Sociological methodology including survey, interview, historical study, case study, and statistical analysis are employed to gather information from World War II informants, and measure such findings against the historical writings of Carl von Clausewitz, Charles Ardent duPicq, J. Glenn Gray, S. L. A. Marshall, Samuel Hynes, Paul Fussell, John Keegan, Gerald F. Linderman, and the military statistical studies of Samuel A. Stouffer, Carl I. Hovland, and John Dollard.;Chapters explore a history of previous research on the subject, including a study of war and the human mindset, the psychological objectives behind testing and training of combat personnel, the, thinking behind why America fought in World War II, the realities of war, the evolution of a combat mentality, morale within the combat unit, and the mindset of killing. Deliberately excluded is a study of the serviceman's return home and his emotional reactions to the war, since this would entail a study of “battle fatigue,” or “post-traumatic stress disorder,” psychological conditions clearly outside the scope of this study. The end result of this study is not meant to extrapolate the findings of the selected informants to all World War II informants, but to determine to what degree accepted historical scholarship is applicable to the smaller selected group. Both consistencies and inconsistencies were anticipated when measuring the findings of the selected group against the thousands of informants researched in earlier scholarly studies. It was expected that general patterns would emerge reflecting the thoughts, emotions, and reactions of the selected participants. |
