Watching the rising sun: German and American military attache reports and intelligence failure in Japan, 1931--1939

This dissertation, through the systematic and detailed evaluation and comparative analysis of German and American military and naval attache reports on Japan from 1931--1939, argues that both German and American attaches failed to provide adequate military intelligence information on Japan for the period in question. Both Germany and the United States misunderstood and incorrectly assessed Japanese aims and capabilities on the eve of World War II. German attaches generally overestimated Japanese potential for expansion on the Asian mainland, and in particular Japanese aims for expansion at the expense of the Soviet Union. American attaches generally underestimated the Japanese ability to wage war and misunderstood Japan's commitment to its affairs in China. As a result, both Germany and the United States misjudged Japanese intentions and capabilities in World War II, with negative consequences for each nation.;Attache reports were the most important intelligence source for both Germany and the United States in the 1930's, and any attempt at characterizing the intelligence efforts of Germany and the United States in Japan must take these reports into account. This dissertation utilizes reports deposited at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and at the Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv Freiburg in Freiburg, Germany. While historical evaluations of intelligence efforts prior to World War II exist, there are very few studies pertaining to attaches, and this dissertation will be the first to attempt a systematic and detailed evaluation of the "ground-level" intelligence collected by observers such as attaches. This project should help, therefore, to fill a gap in the historical record by providing a clearer understanding of German and American intelligence on Japan prior to World War II.