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Emotion, control, and responsibility: A historical investigation (Nicolas Malebranche, Benedictus de Spinoza, David Hume)

Posted on:2006-12-18Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:The Johns Hopkins UniversityCandidate:Bowditch, NathanielFull Text:PDF
GTID:1455390005992847Subject:Philosophy
Abstract/Summary:
In this dissertation I engage a problem that emerges when we consider our pretheoretical views of the emotions. On the one hand we view emotions as non-rational impulses over which we have no control. On the other hand, we see emotions as manifestations of our character for which we are, and should be, held responsible. The tension between these two views of emotions emerges in the following problem. Responsibility presupposes control, and so if emotions cannot be controlled, then people should not be held responsible for their emotions. But, as a matter of fact, we do hold people responsible for their emotions. This suggests that our moral practices, at least with respect to the emotions, are inconsistent and thus unjustified.; I engage this problem by addressing the question of whether, and if so how, we can control our emotions to the writings of Malebranche, Spinoza, and Hume. In Chapter One I develop the problem sketched above, situate it within the contemporary philosophical landscape, and explain how the historical investigation I undertake helps to clarify it. In Chapter Two I explore Malebranche's approach to reconciling two apparently contradictory claims: that God is the only entity with 'real' causal power, and that it is man, and not God, who is responsible for man's emotions and passion-induced sins. Chapter Three explores Spinoza's effort to articulate a conception of control for the emotions that does not run afoul of his deterministic metaphysics. Hume, whose writings are the subject of Chapter Four, reorients the discussion by challenging the claim that responsibility presupposes control, insisting that though there is little or nothing a person can do to control her emotions, our moral practices are in no way compromised by this fact. In Chapter Five, I conclude by reconsidering the contemporary problem sketched above, and suggest a variety of ways in which the writings of Malebranche, Spinoza, and Hume might help us resolve it to our satisfaction.
Keywords/Search Tags:Emotions, Hume, Malebranche, Spinoza, Problem, Responsibility
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