| This dissertation draws on social constructivism, political psychology, and discourse analysis to explain German foreign policy behavior involving military interventions after the end of the Cold War. On the basis of three case studies (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq), my research shows that Germany's traumatic experiences during and after WWII---often cited as the main source of German antimilitarism throughout the Cold War and during the early 1990s---still act as a constraint on German foreign policy. Especially participation in military interventions has to be reconciled with the so-called 'lessons of history.' The successful adoption of those lessons, one of which is to practice a responsible foreign policy, has become an important aspect of German national identity. However, through rhetorically manipulating the interpretation of these lessons and the specific meaning of responsibility in each individual case, the members of the Bundestag manage to reconcile their decisions---to intervene without UN approval in Kosovo, to reluctantly participate in Afghanistan, and to refuse participation in Iraq---with German history, thus appeasing audiences at home and abroad, while still pursuing German interests. Political rhetoric becomes an important factor in Germany's foreign policy decision-making process, as approval of military interventions abroad depends on the interpretation of German history in each case and the ability of the Bundestag to rhetorically reconcile their decision with the 'lessons learned.'... |
