| Chapter 1, Peremptory Challenges and Jury Selection: I examine how peremptory challenges, which are vetoes that attorneys may use on prospective jurors, affect jury composition. The purpose of peremptory challenges is to eliminate biased jurors, however I show that under the two most common rules used in the United States peremptory challenges make biased juries more likely. I show that if unanimity is required for conviction, the distribution of juror types is symmetric, and each attorney has the same number of challenges, then challenges benefit the prosecution.;Chapter 2, Characterizing the Set of Stable Matches in Many-to-One Matching Markets with Contracts: In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I show that there is no restriction on preferences weaker than substitutable preferences which guarantees that the set of stable matches is a lattice. Thus, when contracts are not substitutes, removing agents from the economy may decrease the payoffs to existing agents on both sides of the market. I introduce a new necessary condition to guarantee existence of a stable match and a separate new sufficient condition. These conditions show that new restrictions on individual preferences can be generated by explicitly defining them relative to market primitives.;Chapter 3, Contracts v. Preferences Over Colleagues in Matching: I introduce a general many-to-one matching framework which includes the matching with contracts model as well as models of matching with preferences over colleagues as special cases. I show that this general model can be embedded into the model with contracts, thus the models are equivalent, and all results from the many-to-one matching with preferences over colleagues literature can be applied to the model with contracts. |
