| Berlinian value pluralism, with its emphasis on incompatibility and incommensurability, is subject to many different interpretations because of the loose, unsystematic way in which Berlin originally introduced his ideas. A controversy has thus arisen about what exactly Berlinian value pluralism entails and what its political implications might be. Two issues feature prominently in such debates. The first is whether such value pluralism allows for (or even requires) states to be proactive in creating pluralist policies and encouraging pluralist thinking. Those who believe states should be proactive in such ways are prescriptivist value pluralists, while those who believe states should not be proactive, but rather reactive, are restrictivist value pluralists. The second major issue is whether Berlinian value pluralism suggests or entails some form of liberalism, where liberalism is a political system that gives priority to individual liberties, especially those involving making one's own choices without external coercion.;The purpose of the dissertation is to explain these two issues more clearly than they have previously been explained and to offer a prescriptivist approach to Berlinian value pluralism that seems to resolve many of the problems that have resulted from previous works on value pluralist politics. The position offered is not liberal, since traditions are espoused as equally important to liberty. However, the proactive approach to creating policies and a culture of pluralism that is offered does share many characteristics with current liberal practices, including an emphasis on education and certain minimal rights. The key difference is that the argument acknowledges that liberties can conflict with other important ways that people decide value conflicts, and states must not only allow but also encourage all such approaches to deciding conflicts. Liberties have no special place in this regard that sets them above other approaches. |
