| The first paper, "Dating as Learning," extends the Becker (1973) and Burdett-Coles (1997) models of marriage markets by assuming that, on initial contact, people do not know the payoff to marriage. Instead, they receive a signal of this payoff, and can choose between marrying, separating, or entering a temporary relationship called dating. Within this context, people learn characteristics about the match over time, and one person may know his or her true value of the match while the other does not know. I characterize the resulting equilibrium.;In the second paper, "A Model of Interviewing," I develop a model of interviewing with heterogeneous workers and heterogeneous matches, in which workers have a cost to being interviewed. I establish parameters for which lower productivity workers are not willing to be interviewed, and hence have a higher payoff than some workers who are willing to be interviewed. This demonstrates that being a higher productivity worker is not necessarily preferable to being a lower productivity worker. |
