| I develop a game-theoretic model to examine the means by which political stability is attained, the timing of decisive action that brings about conflict resolution, and the overall duration of transitional conflicts. I view the transitional conflict process as an increasingly costly and high stakes political contest that ends only after the groups involved make major concessions that lead to negotiations or after they use decisive force to impose a settlement. This view is formalized as a "war-of-attrition" model with two exit options of either making concessions or using force with each contending group withholding the information about its own power. In the focal equilibrium, for a group whose power is below the threshold for using decisive force, the greater the power of the group, the longer major concessions will be delayed, while for a group above the threshold, the greater the power, the shorter the delay before the use of decisive force.; The decision to use decisive force depends on the one-time cost of using decisive force and the net benefit of prevailing, but not on any appraisal of the everyday cost accumulation from crisis continuation. The greater the one-time cost to a group for using decisive force, the less likely the use of decisive force by its opponent, the sooner the time of concession by the opponent if the opponent is below the threshold, and the later the time of using decisive force by the opponent if the opponent is above the threshold. This result makes clear the role of such moves as building forces in a particular area---perhaps even if their long-term military indefensibility in that area is known---or of building housing settlements in areas that perhaps increase one side's own cost of reaching a resolution it favors. This study suggests that economic development is conducive to less violent and shorter transitional conflicts. It also suggests certain conditions that disfavor third party interventions in transitional conflicts and points out the conditions where economic diplomacy, in particular the idea that a promise of post-conflict aid can accelerate the timing of conflict resolution, can have perverse effects.; To establish the theoretical model's empirical relevance and to illustrate its logic in the context of actual transitional conflicts, the dissertation examines the nature and the timing of political stabilizations in five episodes of transitional conflicts in South Africa (the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, the Soweto Crisis from 1976 to 1977, and the Total Onslaught from 1984 to 1990) and in South Korea (the Kwangju Massacre in 1980 and the Voluntary Exit from 1986 to 1987). Overall, this study makes contributions to the literature on political transitions and civil conflicts by providing a new and rigorous theoretical framework to study the process of attaining political order and the timing of political stabilization in transitional conflicts. |
