| This dissertation presents a generalization of the standard career concerns model and applies it to the public teacher labor market. This generalized model predicts workers dynamically change their level of effort according to the benefits that may incur to them through their reputations over the course of their careers. Empirical evidence from the teacher labor market is presented that shows teachers' behaviors are consistent with those predicted in the model. Specifically, two data sources are used in this dissertation. First, administrative data from North Carolina spanning 13 school years provide evidence that teachers' absence behaviors respond to changes in career concerns incentives. Second, nationally representative data from the Schools and Staffing Survey shows teachers' self-reported work hours outside of the classroom are likewise consistent with the theoretical predictions. In both data sources, a test of exogenous changes in teachers' career concerns using principal tenure shows the detected changes in effort are not solely attributable to the endogeneity of teachers' tenure decisions. The results presented here suggest teachers have considerable discretion over the level of effort they input into educational production, which has strong implications for compensation reform proposals that seek to link public teachers' wages with student learning outcomes. |
