| Recent legal and philosophical debate has given much attention to the question of whether a person has a right to die, and if so, under what circumstances such a right may exist. Those who reject the existence of the right typically do so on the grounds that (a) death is necessarily an evil to be avoided at all costs, and (b) perseveration of life must trump any autonomous desire to end one's own life. The modern United States puts particular focus on, (b), as it has on several occasions (often through decisions rendered by the Supreme Court) denied the right to die by affirming the state's "unqualified interest in preserving human life.";In this dissertation, I argue that, given the basic principles that animate the liberal democratic state, the right to die should be included as an extension of those principles. And as I defend in several places throughout this dissertation, I treat "the right to die" as morally interchangeable with "the right to end one's life (with assistance, if necessary)." This defense will be primarily moral in character, but will draw upon the legal history of the United States as well. In this way, my argument will be of a legal non-positivist variety. I begin with a brief historical synopsis of the basic moral principles of liberal democracy, whose proponents include Locke, Jefferson, and Mill. I contend that there are four core moral values---those which ground the constitutional rights we currently enjoy---which are advocated by each of the historical figures I discuss: equality, autonomy, individuality, and respect for human dignity. I conclude that a proper conception of liberal democratic theory must place the highest emphasis on individual rights and values, even when they may conflict with social considerations.;I continue by arguing that a genuine right to life must be viewed as more than mere biological function, and I therefore incorporate Bernard Williams' discussion of ground projects as a basis for a "content-full" view of life. Further, I maintain that the right to life (and, eventually, the right to die) is a fundamental right, or "right in the strong sense" as Ronald Dworkin describes it. Next, I offer a pragmatic assessment of the rights already accepted within the modern United States, all guaranteed under the pretense of the right to life. Given a nuanced view of life considered from a perspective of quality instead of quantity, and given the autonomy allowed in other (potentially dangerous) areas of life, I argue that the state's rejection of the right to die is inconsistent with the core moral values the found the fundamental rights of liberal democracy. I explore potential reasons for this, and draw from the work of Lucretius, Thomas Nagel, and F.M. Kamm as they discuss the phenomenon of death as a necessary evil.;Next, I offer a positive account of the right to die. People already have the legal rights to lead their lives as they see fit, as long as their behaviors are not harmful to others. And these rights are derived from certain moral principles that underwrite the framework of the liberal democratic state. It is my contention that the right to die as I will describe it results from the same moral principles as those rights---particularly those involving autonomous self-direction and individuality---already guaranteed to citizens.;I conclude the dissertation by considering six possible objections to my account, and I respond to each in order. I maintain that even the most philosophically salient arguments against the right to die as I have characterized it do not trump the depth to which the right to die is consistent with the core moral values of liberal democratic theory. |
