Justifying international criminal law: A normative basis for holding individuals accountable to the world

This project explores the moral basis for international criminal law. In doing so it addresses two issues. The first three chapters examine approaches to determining from where authority for government and law arises, especially relating to international law. The following five chapters examine the domain and function of international criminal law, and consider how best the goals and purpose of international law can be institutionally supported. In its contribution to determining the source of international legal authority, chapter one considers and rejects John Rawls' position that his Justice as Fairness model, highly regarded as a way to evaluate domestic institutions, can be transferred to the international sphere by regarding democratic and "just" states as hypothetical decision-makers. The second chapter examines the Cosmo-Rawlsian body of work which provides a more reasonable application of Rawls' domestic theory to the international context by including the reasonable choices of all persons globally as the foundation. The third chapter proposes and develops a better foundation for international criminal law: human rights. This chapter develops a hierarchical conception of human rights that demands international protection for serious physical security human rights.;But, arguing that any serious human rights violation is not sufficient to demand prosecution at the international level, chapter four claims that perversion of political organization is what makes international crime so atrocious as to require the explicit condemnation of the international community. All people have an interest in safeguarding political organization: guarding it from morphing into something threatening, from organized political groups developing into hazardous entities as perpetrators of horrendous crimes or as ready-made and identifiable victims. Chapter five explores the Collective-vs.-Individual Responsibility debate and promotes further divisions in international criminal categories. Chapter six explores what global legal interest means and criticizes the international legal acceptance of universal jurisdiction. Chapter seven evaluates international judicial mechanisms. Finally, chapter eight, responding to the critique that international criminal law is culturally insensitive to non-Western societies, argues that retributive justice is appropriate and relevant globally but that sensitivity to the needs for different contexts in establishing peace is necessary.;Keywords. International Criminal Law; Contemporary Liberalism; Human Rights; Transitional Justice.