Plato and Epicurus on pleasure, perception and value

Plato and Epicurus write philosophical ethics within a common eudaimonist framework, and even agree on many substantive ethical questions. However, they disagree over the most fundamental question in eudaimonist ethics, namely what it is for a human being to live well. In particular, while Epicurus identifies the good for a human being with pleasure, Plato denies this identity. The extent to which they share other views makes this difference difficult to understand. In this dissertation, I argue that their disagreement over hedonism is best explained by reference to a broader disagreement over the epistemic value of perception. Both take bodily pleasure and pain to be perceptions of good and bad for the subject of the perception. However, Plato believes that our perceptions sometimes mislead us, and that even if perception is purged of error, it does not provide the epistemic materials for arriving at an adequate understanding of the world. On the other hand, Epicurus argues that all perceptions are true, and he believes that by subjecting our use of perceptual evidence to strict epistemological and methodological rules, we can arrive at an adequate understanding of the world. In addition to arguing that these commitments explain Plato's anti-hedonism and Epicurus' hedonism, I show that close attention to their views about perception is helpful in coming to understand the particular kind of anti-hedonism endorsed by Plato and the particular kind of hedonism endorsed by Epicurus.