Economic analysis of aircraft and airport noise regulations

The aviation industry has sought to address the negative externality of aircraft noise using a variety of approaches, but there has been little theoretical work to date encompassing both the market implications and the social optimality of air transportation noise policy. This dissertation develops simple theoretical models to analyze the effects of noise regulation on an airline's scheduling, aircraft 'quietness', and airfare choices. Monopolistic and duopolistic airline competition are modelled, and two types of noise limits are considered: maximum cumulative noise from aircraft operations and noise per aircraft operation. As expected, tighter noise limits, which reduce community exposure to noise, also cause airlines to reduce service frequency and raise fares, which hurts consumers. Welfare analysis investigates the social optimality of noise regulation, taking into account the social cost of exposing airport communities to noise damage, as well as consumer surplus and airline profit. Numerical simulations show that the type of noise limit has a significant effect on the magnitude of the first-best and second-best optimal solutions for service frequency, cumulative noise, and aircraft size and level of quietness. Furthermore, the numerical analyses suggest that under the more realistic second-best case, the cumulative noise limit might be a preferable policy instrument over the per-aircraft noise limit. In the monopoly's parameter space exploration, welfare is found to be slightly higher, cumulative noise is lower, and the fare is slightly lower when the planner controls cumulative noise rather than per-aircraft noise. In the duopoly case, when the per-aircraft limit yields greater welfare than the cumulative limit, the per-aircraft limit offers only modest welfare gains above the levels achieved with the cumulative limit. But when the cumulative limit yields greater welfare than the per-aircraft limit, the cumulative limit offers substantial welfare gains above the levels achieved with the per-aircraft limit. The effects of noise taxation and the optimal level of noise taxes are also investigated with the duopoly model; the analysis shows equivalence between noise taxation and the cumulative noise limit.