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Research On The Optimization Of The Contract Between The Platform And The Farmer's Professional Cooperative Under The Crowd-creation Model

Posted on:2021-03-23Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y F HuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1369330632453370Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Over the past 40 years of reform and opening-up,the process of urbanization and the transformation of agriculture have gradually deepened,farmers have gradually differentiated into small farmers,specialized farmers,family farms,cooperatives and agricultural industrialization enterprises,which are new-type agricultural production.For most countries in the world,the main producers of agricultural products are“small and scattered” farmers,this traditional management model is an important constraint to the shift to batch and industrialization of agriculture.Large-scale supermarket and chain operation give birth to “the joint of agricultural products and supermarkets”,and the scattered farmers are in a weak bargaining position.The horizontal cooperation of farmers based on contract forms the benefit distribution mechanism of “company + farmer”,“market + farmer”,“intermediary + farmer” is harmful to the interests of farmers.So,we put forward the following research direction: we should build a modern management model of small farmers and Cooperatives,and explore the decision-making mechanism to maximize farmers' interests under the model;Based on the Revenue-sharing Contract model,we reveals the influencing factors of supply chain coordination under the new background.Under the Crowd Innervation model(CIM),the impact of farmer's and platform's behavior on supply chain performance has important significance for improving management ability,sustainable development and upgrading dominant model.Under the background of “Internet + agriculture”,the CIM based on the farmland transfer is constructed as the optimization model.According to the previous research,referencing the Revenue Sharing Contract(RSC)model applied in supply chain management,considering the Farmland Transfer Revenue(FTR),Risk Cost(RC)and Farmer's Efforts Level(FEL).We study the difference of RC measurement caused by different risk transfer paths under different organizational structures of farmers.Using Stackelberg Game model to analyze cooperative,farmer,small farmers and platform strategy combination affects decision-making performance and supply chain coordination in different models.This paper mainly answers fourquestions: how to control FTR and Expected Sales(ES)? The first decision maker decides the FTR and ES on the basis of revenue maximization and has an influence on the second maker.What are the appropriate efforts for farmer,platform and supply chain? The efforts determine the ES of farmer,and at the same time,it will bring Efforts Cost(EC).Therefore,farmers need to balance the increase of efforts and EC.Are farmer cooperate,cooperation ways and boundaries? Cooperation can improve industry capacity,reorganize decision-making order and increase ES.Do decision makers' priorities improve supply chain performance? Explore the impact of priorities on supply chain performance when considering RC.Farmer or platform dominating and considering FEL or not constitute the four research subject,analyze farmers' and platform's performance in five decision models,and extract some conclusions: first,cooperative's pioneer advantage can improve themselves' profits;Second,under certain conditions,the cooperative mode can realize platform's profits increase and supply chain coordination.Third,small farmers' profits are usually reduced in the cooperative mode;Fourth,the profits margin of small farmers can be compensated in an effective way and make it no less than the average profits of farmer in completely decentralized mode.Considering FEL gets some different conclusions: first,priority reduces the total profits of all farmers with platform dominating,priority increases the total profits of all farmers with farmer dominating.Second,considering FEL,when the profits of small farmers are reduced,it can be compensated through effective measures.The profits of both parties are not lower than the completely decentralized mode.The suggestions are as follows: First,reasonable efforts is the basis for increasing farmers' revenue.Second,well-matched FTR is a premise for increasing platform revenue,and FTR has inductive effects on farmers' behavior.Third,moderate scale of agricultural production is common pursuit of farmers and platform.Fourth,small farmers' benefits compensation mechanism is the key to sustainability of models.Fifth,redefining the identity and nature of cooperative and platforms is a guarantee for achieving win-win results for all participants.Sixth,the dominance mode transfer from ‘platform' to ‘farmer' is an inevitable trend of the CIM development.Seventh,the sustainable development of the CIM cannot be achievedwithout the joint help of the government and agricultural social organizations.The contributions are as follows: First,we constructed the agricultural CIM based on the “Internet + agriculture”,considered the factors of farmland transfer and consumer evaluation,and regarded as important decision variables of FTR and efforts in model design.Second,the RC is expressed as a function to analyze the cost under different decision-making models,previous research believes that the risk flow is transmitted with information.Risk flow is transformed into RC at decision node,which is used to analyze the impact of risk flow on the cost of decision makers in supply chain.Third,we consider the influence of FEL on the demand function,generally,higher CAE also brings higher EC;It is impossible for farmers to increase their revenue through unlimited efforts;rational farmers need to balance the increasing ES and EC.Fourth,by setting a “limited increment” to control the agent's moral hazard,it is assumed that the farmer(or cooperatives)enjoys the floating quantity in the range of the average increase of all the farmers.This limited“privilege” effectively controls the moral hazard of farmers and cooperatives.Although these conclusions have achieved certain achievements in theory and practice,they are under certain hypothesis,because of the hypothesis limitation,the model still has many research options,which needs to be made up and perfected in the following research: First,the demand function hypothesis,the relationship between them and the demand function have many forms,in those,the exponential function form is more common.Second,about the ES hypothesis,this paper defines the relationship between EC and CAE as a quadratic function.It's used to reflect the marginal increase law of EC,to limit farmer to increase ES through unlimited efforts.Third,about the RC hypothesis,according to the relevant literature,it is assumed that the relationship between RC and risk value is an exponential function.Although these hypotheses are based on relevant literature,there may still be a distance between them and the reality,in future studies,it is necessary to pay attention to approaching the actual from multiple aspects and angles,such as fitting functions based on actual data.
Keywords/Search Tags:Farmland Transfer, Farmer Professional Cooperatives, Risk Cost, Agricultural Crowd Innervation Model, Supply Chain Coordination
PDF Full Text Request
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