| Under urban-rural dual system of land,farmers or rural collectives have no rights to change the farmland use and only get limited compensation based on agricultural value in land development and utilization.Thus,rural collectives have lost land capital bases to develop economics,and also,farmers' land rights were violated.Under these circumstances,the imbalance between urban and rural development and the income disparity of urban and rural residents cannot be changed effectively.As a result,the Communist Party's 3rd Plenary Session of 18 has claimed that China should "allow more farmer equally to participate in modernization process and co-share modernization achievement","entitle farmers more property rights and promote urban-rural resources equally exchange".The Communist Party's 5th Plenary Session of 18 further required that government should"focus on promoting the coordinated development of urban and rural areas" and "raise the construction level of new socialist countryside".Therefore,it is a significant measure to develop rural collective economics,strengthen farmers' land property rights and realize the integration of urban and rural development to entitle rural collectives substantial land development rights through collective construction land transfer in the market.In fact,rural collective construction land transfer has widely appeared and acted as innovative pilot for some areas and the physical base for rural economic development and household income increase,though the law still forbids rural collectives using it to non-agricultural land development or construction.But overall,the bases are still very weak for the limitation in power,quantity and location of collective land that can be developed by farmers.Besides,farmers also cannot share land increment benefits because of both the blur property rights relationship within rural collectives and the difficulty in qualifying collective assets.The situation that village collective,construction land transfer increment revenue is relatively low,and the situation that farmers' land rights can't be guaranteed within the collective constitute the starting point for our research in the new collective construction land transfer increment revenue distribution path.Institutional economics believe that when the transaction cost was too large,benefits obtained from the collective construction land transfer transactions and increment revenue distribution may be offset by the transaction costs.So it is necessary to reduce the transaction costs as far as possible.Therefore,this paper is devoted to exploring the governance structure and institutional environment of collective construction land transfer income distribution to promote rural economic development and farmers' rights protection through innovating the circulation mode,establishing income distribution order and reforming the corresponding institutional environment.The paper is followed with the order of "theoretical analysis-mainstream analysis-case analysis and experience summary-policy recommendations".We analyzed the theory and practice of collective construction land transfer income distribution from the aspects of both the governance structure and institutional environment.The main problems existing in the current collective construction land transfer and income distribution management and the reform goal were defined.Through the analysis of three cases in Jiangsu South of Jiangsu area,we summarized the system innovation and management experience between the village collective and the government,between the village collective and enterprises,and among the farmers in village collective.The conclusions are as follows:(1)Firstly,from theoretical level,we conclude that giving farmer collectives partial land development rights is the foundation of rational land revenue allocation between government and collectives.According to the principle of fair starting point,governments are the owner of state-owned land and acquire land development rights.If to pursue property rights equality between urban and rural land,collectives,as the owner of collective land,should be given land development rights.If farmers' land developments collide with urban and rural planning,they are obligated to receive their development rights being limited,but still need be compensated reasonably.Therefore,the government should allow the collectives to have partial land development rights within the permitted construction area.The government can adjust the income by collecting land taxes,and go on the second land income allocation to protect the interests of farmers whose land development rights are restricted.According to the principle of procedural justice,as to the land income distribution within the collective,we must fully protect the farmers' right to know,the right to supervise and the right to express dissent.(2)Owing to the restriction of governance structure and institutional environment,in the mainstream governance structure of collective construction land transfer income distribution,no matter in direct collective construction land transfer revenue distribution or cross-region land transfer revenue distribution,rural economy development and farmers rights protection are both unrealized.So,the mainstream governance structure of collective construction land transfer income distribution still need explore the reform in land system,land circulation governance structure and collective economic governance structure.(3)In order to develop village economy and protect farmers' rights,it is required to broaden the scope of cross regional circulation,define the governance boundaries between market and governments,innovate land transfer contract and improve the management of collective hierarchical governance.?)Land centralized transfer,reasonable governance boundaries between market and governments,and specialized land management can improve the efficiency of land resource allocation and protect collective's interests,which can be obtained from the Kunshan "land concentration and rights protection " governance structure.While because of the effects of property right system,reserved land system and planning system,the available share of land value-added income in Kunshan practice still needs to be strengthened.So,when pursuing land centralized transfer and specialized land management,reforms in institutional environment are required.?)Increasing the price and term flexibility of transfer contract could help collectives to continually share land value.This conclusion can be obtained from the Yixing "long rent system and short appointment'governance structure.While due to the decentralized governance structure and poor economic location inside the village,the collective construction land use in Yixing is as low as 72 yuan square meter per year,which limits the total income of village collectives and farmers.iii)Collective community stock cooperative helps to protect the land rights and interests of farmers,which can be obtained from Taicang community stock cooperative governance structure.While farmers' rights and interests have not been fully guaranteed.The reason for this result can be ascribed to the defects in governance structure involved in institutional settings and the stock rights arrangement in the cooperatives.As a result,protecting farmers' interests still need to reform the governance structure of cooperatives.(4)Reforming the institutional environment and governance structure of circulation and income distribution and reducing transaction cost are the important ways to improve the governance structure efficiency.The three governance structures have their own advantages in the governance efficiency,but there are also shortcomings.i)In Kunshan "land concentration and rights protection" governance structure,every village collective establishes "strong company".Through centralized trade mechanism,transaction cost existing in separate land transfer has been reduced.In Yixing "long rent system and short appointment" governance structure,reliable land property right security system,arbitration and enforcement system in land transfer are provided by governments' executable and clear bills,which reduce the uncertainty of circulation transactions,as well as corresponding monitoring and enforcement costs.However,in the practice of Kunshan and Yixing,formal system of collective construction land transfer has not been established in the form of national legislation.As a result,instability of collective construction land property leads to uncertainty in land transfer.Otherwise,a mature intermediary market for collective construction land transfer is still not set up,and the information search cost is still high.To this end,we need to reform the land system environment,including property rights protection system,right registration system and trading platform system.ii)In Taicang community share cooperatives,the work of "defining equity but not defining land" and equity immobilization can both effectively reduce the adjustment cost of ownership structure and shareholder value;Besides,construction of collective financial supervision and asset management platform can make oversight in cooperatives more efficient and cheaper.However,when it comes to the cost of congress exercising supreme power,councils making decisions and supervising councils'behavior,Taicang community share cooperatives have much progressive space.As a result,it is necessary to further improve the governance structure of community stock cooperatives.Based on the results above,under the goal of developing village economy and protecting farmers' land rights,this paper constructs the governance structure and institutional environment characteristics of collective construction land circulation and income distribution from the theoretical level.We construct it from the aspects of improving resource allocation results,including how to increase land transfer value and make the collective and farmers share land value rationally,and from the aspects of improving the governance structure efficiency,expecting to provide a general framework for the reform of collective construction land transfer income distribution in China.On the other hand,in the light of analysis of the three-regional governance structure innovation,the paper puts forward certain suggestions on the reform of governance structure and corresponding system environment in practice level,expecting to provide targeted and operational countermeasures for the reform of collective construction land transfer income distribution in China. |
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