Study On The Risk Control Of The Land Contract Management Right Mortgage Loan

The reform of the separation of land ownership,contracting rights and management rights in rural areas is another major innovation in the rural land system with Chinese characteristics.It is also the only way to develop modern agriculture.This paper is an empirical research on mortgage loan risk control of farmland contracted management rights based on the structural reforms and innovative needs of the financial supply side of agricultural land and system complexity management scientific research ideas.Mortgage loans in agricultural land are an international and historic issue,with relevance and diversity in time and space;the pilot risk control of mortgage loans for farmland contracted management rights is a major issue in the current agricultural land financial reform.Special system complexity.The paper closely combines the reality of further deepening reforms in China,the urgency of the era of rural financial research and practice,and the main theme of deepening reforms in rural financial development.Based on the comprehensive review of previous classic literature in the fixed-point research of the innovation team,the data from five surveys in Ningxia and Shaanxi in the past four years were aggregated,and 3SLS,SEM,DEA,Simulink,and Logostic models were used to conduct preliminary empirical analysis to deconstruct farmland contracting operations.Risk pre-judgment of mortgage loans,risk response,influencing factors,farmers'satisfaction,farmers'willingness to participate,risk control effects,etc.,conducted system simulation and simulation experiments on risk control of rural households,and conducted a network optimization path analysis of risk control technologies for farmers.Improve.On the basis of research perspectives and technological innovations,it seeks to construct both theoretical depth and both easy-to-operate theories and programs.The logical construction of the thesis framework is:This study firstly identifies the risks based on the review of the mortgage pilot project for rural land contracted management rights,and conducts a risk test and a factor analysis through a policy experiment on farmer satisfaction,and estimates the risk factor of the policy test as 0.2247.According to this,it is divided into three categories:agricultural land contracted management rights mortgage loan environmental risk control,farmland contracting management right mortgage loan farmer risk control and farmland contracting management right mortgage loan institution risk control.Comprehensive analysis and quantitative evaluation of the risk control effect;Finally,the research conclusions are drawn and feasible policy recommendations are given.The conclusion of the study is:(1)The pilot risk control of mortgage loans for farmland contracted management rights has special system complexity.Differentiated supervision and classification control are required;risk control in the current pilot inspection process obviously lacks economies of scale,but it is technically feasible.On the whole,the mortgage loan policy for farmland contracted management rights is a good policy for Huimin and support farmers,and farmers are generally satisfied.However,there is still a certain room for policy improvement.It is necessary to further optimize the rural policy environment based on the behavior of the relevant policy bodies and their own agro-institutions.In particular,improving the rural financial ecological environment and harmonizing the legal and policy mutually supportive institutional environment are imperative.At the same time,strengthening policy advocacy and improving the quality of financial services is also a protracted war.It is inevitable that there will be certain risks in the trial of mortgage loans for farmland contracted management rights,including policy risks.For mortgage loans where the relationship accounts for the majority of the population and the disadvantaged land contractual management rights,it is necessary to make early warnings,prevent accidents,and control afterwards in risk control.In particular,it is necessary to strengthen the systematic complexity control of its environmental risks,farmers'behavioral risks and institutional risks.(2)The differential control of the environmental risk of mortgage loans for rural contracted management rights is the bottleneck that affects the ultimate effect of the reform.The problems of economic and financial reforms and development in various regions have relatively obvious general and specific characteristics of economic contradictions.And the proportion of both in different time and space is different.Sometimes or some areas are mainly general,and sometimes or some areas are based on particularity.The former requires that we design policies on the basis of generality with reference to specificity;the latter requires us to arrange policies on the basis of particularity with reference to generality.Distinguish between the primary and secondary,take both into consideration,and consider it comprehensively.The implementation in ethnic areas undoubtedly involves the economic interests of minorities and special production,living and religious customs.We must fully consider and treat differently when designing economic and financial reform policies.(3)Farmland contracting management rights The practice of the behavioral risk control of rural households with mortgage loans is:The behavioral risk of rural households is represented by financing behavioral risk and investment behavioral risk.Among them,the financing behavior of rural households leads to their own risk assessment of agricultural land,risk of financing quantity,and risk of repayment deadline,and further measures need to be taken to optimize control.(4)Empirically found that the current farmland contracted management rights mortgage loan pilot behavior financial institutions credit risk control is effective in scale,and there is a lot of room for improvement in technology.On the one hand,the credit risk control of rural financial institutions in the current trial of rural land contractual management mortgages is excessive,thus affecting the effective manifestation of inclusive financial nature of the policy,and the government~'s top-level design,new urbanization and agricultural modernization.The vision is farther away;on the other hand,the resulting risk of the farmers themselves is objective.The empirical analysis believes that the farmers'views on the valuation of land are the key and difficult issues affecting farmers'willingness to participate in the mortgage financing of contracted farmland management rights in the future.