| Closed-loop supply chains(CLSCs)can not only promote the efficient reuse of resources,reduce the environmental pollution and landfill space and achieve sustainable develop,but also bring enterprises considerable economic benefits,which make it already gain extensive attention in theoretical and practical.Meanwhile,due to the pressure from legislations,the producers must conduct the recycling and remanufacturing of their used products.Considering the different roles of chain members,each chain member often possesses private information and other chain members have no idea about the information.With the rapid development of technology,it is significant to efficiently obtain information and promote information sharing among chain members.Therefore,this paper inserts information sharing into a CLSC by using related methods of game theory and supply chain management,builds decision models based on manufacturer-remanufacturing,distributor-remanufacturing,third-party remanufacturing,and supplier-remanufacturing,respectively,and mainly focuses on the resultant influence of the introduce of information sharing on the CLSC.Firstly,this paper investigates the impact of the distributor's information sharing behavior on the CLSC when the manufacturer takes the responsibility of recycling and remanufacturing.Compare two CLSC decision models,namely no-remanufacturing and manufacturer-remanufacturing,and study the effect of demand forecast value and demand forecast accuracy on chain members' pricing strategies and profits.It is found that,under both no-remanufacturing and manufacturer-remanufacturing models,the wholesale price and retail price would increase with the increase of the demand forecast value when the distributor shares information with the manufacturer,and under the manufacturer-remanufacturing model,a larger demand forecast value would make the manufacturer to raise the acquisition price of used products.From the perspective of chain members,the demand forecast accuracy has a positive impact on both the distributor's and the manufacturer's profits.Differently,the distributor's profit under information sharing mode is smaller than that under no information sharing mode,while the manufacturer's profit under information sharing mode is larger than that under no information sharing mode.Secondly,this paper develops CLSC decision models in which the manufacturer licenses the distributor and the third party to conduct remanufacturing activities.We derive chain member's pricing strategies and profits with and without information sharing by using game theory,and analyze how the distributor's information sharing behavior affects the optimal licensing strategies of the manufacturer.It is found that,under the distributor-remanufacturing and third-party remanufacturing modes,when the distributor shares his information with the manufacturer,the wholesale price,retail price and acquisition price would increase with the increase of demand forecast value,and chain members' profits would increase with the increase of demand forecast accuracy.Under the distributor-remanufacturing mode,the distributor takes the responsibility of both the product sales and the recycling and remanufacturing of used products,and can earn the maximum profit by adjusting the retail price of products and the acquisition price of used products.Under the third-party remanufacturing mode,the distributor is only engaged in selling products,and the third party takes the responsibility of the recycling and remanufacturing of used products.Therefore,the distributor would decide the retail price to earn profits from selling activities,and the third party sets the acquisition price to collect used products and obtains profits from remanufacturing.Under both distributor-remanufacturing and third-party remanufacturing modes,due to the increase of licensing fee would reduce the motivation of the distributor and the third party to conduct remanufacturing,the manufacturer would always choose the same unit licensing fees in both no information sharing and information sharing modes,and the shared information from the distributor would always allow the manufacturer to make more accurate pricing decisions to obtain more profits.Lastly,this paper investigates the impact of information sharing on the CLSC where the supplier takes the responsibility of the recycling and remanufacturing of used products.Build four information sharing CLSC modes based on the manufacturer and the supplier conducting remanufacturing activities,namely no information sharing,the retailer sharing information with the manufacturer,the retailer sharing information with the supplier,and the retailer sharing information with both the manufacturer and the supplier.The manufacturer-remanufacturing mode is as the benchmark to compare with the supplier-remanufacturing mode.It is found that,when the retailer shares his private information,the wholesale price and the retail price of products would increase with the increase of demand forecast value.Only if the supplier receives the demand information from the retailer,the wholesale price of components and the acquisition price of used products would increase with the increase of demand forecast value.From the perspective of chain members,the profits of the supplier,the manufacturer and the retailer would increase when the demand forecast accuracy is increased.Under the manufacturer-remanufacturing mode,the manufacturer takes the responsibility of producing new products and recycling and remanufacturing of used products,and then he can obtain double benefits.Moreover,since the increase of remanufactured products produced by the manufacturer would affect the sale of new components produced by the supplier,the remanufacturer is not only a buyer but also a competitor to the supplier.While under the supplier-remanufacturing mode,the supplier can set an appropriate wholesale price of components and acquisition price of used products and produce both new and remanufactured components,thus he can coordinate the forward and reverse flows to reach the profit maximization. |
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