| With the rapid development of the automobile industry,the depletion of petroleum resources has accelerated,and the air pollution and greenhouse effect caused by vehicle exhaust emissions have become increasingly serious.People are actively seeking alternative products for traditional fuel vehicles that use fossil fuels as their main energy source.As the representatives of new energy vehicles,electric vehicles have advantages that cannot be matched by traditional automobiles in terms of energy saving and emission reduction,curbing climate warming,and safeguarding oil supply security.They have received extensive attention from various governments,automobile manufacturers,and energy companies,and developed electric vehicles.Automobiles have been widely established as an important way to ensure energy security and transition to a low-carbon economy.The vehicle-to-grid(V2G)is a kind of remote control of electric vehicles to use electric vehicle batteries as a buffer for the grid to provide backup services(such as peaking and reactive power compensation)for the grid.V2G technology realizes the two-way interaction between the grid and the electric vehicle and is an important part of the smart grid technology.However,as a new technology,V2 G still has many problems to be solved in the current implementation.The current academic research on V2 G technology is still in the stage of preliminary demonstration.Most of the research remains on the technical,economic,and environmental impacts that may be brought about after its implementation or on certain aspects of system optimization research.It has not really been charged by electric vehicle users.Discharge behavior and its interests are discussed,resulting in practical operability being questioned.There are few studies on how grid companies motivate electric vehicle users to participate in backup contracts under the V2 G market trading model,and many are focused on transaction prices,but in reality These issues are very important.For this reason,for grid companies,from the motivation of individual EVs to provide V2 G backup services,a rational analysis of participants' willingness to deal and policy responses,and a channel for a grid company and an electric vehicle user are provided.In addition,for the channel members in the supply chain,from the motivation of the other party to provide or schedule V2 G backup,a rational analysis of their respective transaction willingness and policy response is conducted to effectively formulate a trading strategy.For the V2 G standby market,users have relatively high consumer prices and relatively unstable demand,so it is necessary to strengthen the analysis of the microscopic process of the user's standby consumption subsidy and improve the efficiency of subsidy intervention of the grid companies.Therefore,the subsidy under the consumer price subsidy is selected for this purpose.The study of reservation decision and coordination issues was conducted.Research on these issues has important theoretical and practical significance for reducing environmental pollution,promoting the vigorous development of new energy vehicles,and improving the development and application of V2 G technology.From the content,the paper mainly did the following research work:(1)Considering the universal existence of the contract price mechanism of “guarantee for bottom purchase and follow the market”,this paper constructs a V2 G backup contract optimization decision model for single-risk neutral grid companies and single-risk avoidance electric vehicle users,and investigates and compares the decentra-lized and integrated decision-making scenarios.The optimal decision-makingbehaviors and equilibrium profit conditions of the power grid companies and electric vehicle users are under discussion,and the impact of the degree of risk aversion and the contract price on the decision-making behaviors of both sides of the channel is emphatically analyzed.(2)The paper constructs a V2 G standby decision-making model based on risk circumvention characteristics of decision makers and revenue-sharing contracts under the conditions of stochastic market demand,and adopts CVaR risk metrics to establish risk-avoidance decision-making objective functions of power grid companies and electric vehicle users.The factors such as risk aversion degree of V2 G standby channel members,ratio of marginal power supply cost to purchased electricity price,and other factors affecting the equilibrium sales price ratio,the optimal income sharing coefficient,and the channel's equilibrium CVaR profit ratio are discussed.(3)The paper considers the uncertainty of the end-user requirements in the V2 G standby sales-side system,constructs a CVaR user decision-making objective function under the risk metrics,and studies the relationship between the consumption-time risk neutral grid company and the risk-averse user.Alternate reservation decision and consumer price subsidy issue.Among them,in order to avoid the double marginal effect and encourage users to increase V2 G standby power consumption,the power grid company adopts a certain price subsidy to give the user a certain amount of non-consumed electricity.Through the above research,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)Under the decentralized decision model,the V2 G reserve optimal reserve power decided by the electric vehicle user is positively related to the contract price,while the equilibrium contract price determined by the grid company is the lowest reserve price acceptable to the electric vehicle user;at this time,the electric vehicle user selects The equilibrium reserve power is positively correlated with the degree of risk aversion,and the risk of avoiding the electric vehicle user's optimal power reserve is strictly less than the equilibrium electric energy reserve of the risk neutral electric vehicle user;the grid company does not provide any conditions for the coordinative contract.Under the integrated decision-making,the V2 G reserve optimal reserved power of the EV users is greater than the equilibrium power reserve under the decentralized decision,and is positively related to the system unit power outage loss.(2)The overall risk aversion of the channel during centralized decision-making is determined by the member's risk aversion characteristics.At this time,the optimal reserve factor decreases as the channel member's risk aversion decreases.That is,each decision maker is more afraid of risk.The lower the optimal reserve factor,the lower the balance between the equilibrium sales price of V2 G standby under the centralized decision and the risk aversion of the decision maker is not a simple positive/negative correlation,but also the price elasticity coefficient and market random demand of the market demand.The distribution function of the variables is relevant;in the decentralized decision model,the optimal V2 G reserve reserve factor for electric vehicle users is only related to the risk aversion degree of the grid company,and has nothing to do with the degree of risk aversion of the electric vehicle user,and the purchase price and revenue The sharing system will not affect the reservation factor;under the decentralized decision based on revenue-sharing contracts,the purchase price of electricity purchased by electric vehicle users must not be higher than the marginal cost of their supply to the grid company.At this time,the grid company is more afraid of risk.Or the more fearless the electric vehicle user is,the greater the optimal income sharing coefficient determined by the latter.(3)Under the consumer price subsidy strategy,the risk-avoidance user's optimal reserve battery power is negatively correlated with its risk aversion value,and it is positively correlated with the contract price of the reserve booking;the user's risk aversion value will generate a first-order CVaR profit when it is balanced.Negative negative effect;For any given reserve booking contract price,when the user's risk aversion degree meets the constraint,the grid company is willing to unilaterally increase consumer price subsidies.The study also found that in situations where both the grid company and the user have information asymmetry in the risk aversion of the latter,the user has the incentive to falsely report a high risk aversion value in order to increase the optimal CVaR profit obtained.However,if a user falsely reports a low risk aversion value,he will lose CVaR profits.The paper also uses a numerical example to verify the proposed model and method.Highlights and innovations of the present study consist in the following aspects:(1)Under the low-carbon dispatching principle,suppliers considered the used of a combination of low-carbon technologies as a means of integrated marketing communications.Considering the impact of emission reduction technologies and synergy on the load demand of end users and the bounded rational learning on the part of grid corporation in power purchase,we presented a stochastic differential game model of vertical cooperative emission reduction involving the combination of three low-carbon technologies.Thus the effect of symmetry of emission reduction technologies used by the suppliers and the number of technologies used on feedback equilibrium were examined.(2)In the emission reduction tournament with two different initial dispatching endowment,we verified the effect of changing the bonus structure on emission reduction level.When three or four suppliers were involved,increasing the number of winning prize would make the strong decrease or maintain the current intensity of emission reduction;however,the weak would increase or maintain the current intensity of emission reduction.That is,increasing the number of winner neither encouraged further efforts from the strong nor forced the weak to decrease the efforts to reduce emission.(3)To explain the phenomenon of excess efforts to reduce emission among heterogeneous suppliers and the aberration of strong's behaviors under equilibrium in the experiment,we introduced a behavioral economic model that involved social comparison of emission reduction influencing utility functions of participants.Modeling was performed for the psychological loss and gain for the strong and weak,and the psychological parameters of the model were estimated using the data from the verification experiment.Equilibrium predictions from the generalized model without constraint conditions on behaviors more conformed to the actual intensity of emission reduction,while the specific nested model produced results consistent with the theoretical predictions.It is expected that the relevant conclusions obtained in this paper can be used for the scientific decisions of the participants in the V2 G reserve system in terms of optimal decision-making and balanced profit sharing of demand information,the risk aversion characteristics of the decision maker and revenue sharing contract under the condition of stochastic market demand,and the reserve reserve decision-making of the customers on the sales side and the problem of consumer price subsidy.Strategy provides theoretical basis.However,because the V2 G reserve decision and consumer price subsidy problem is a complex and comprehensive problem,involving many aspects,coupled with my limited academic capacity,there are still some difficult content to be further studied. |
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