The Game Of Interests Of Stone Material Exploitation In Minority Areas

Resources exploitation reflects deep contradictions existing in the modern transformation of societies in China.Conflicts in resources exploitation have repeatedly become a hot topic in public discussion.These conflicts are caused by the interest game of all the stakeholders in the process of resources exploitation.The root of this problem is the imbalance of interest distribution among stakeholders in the process of resources exploitation.In many places,there is unfair situation that the positive results of resources exploitation(wealth)have been obtained by a minority of people,while the negative effects of resources exploitation have been borne by local residents.Resources exploitation enterprises’ operators become rich overnight;on the other hand,the residents of the place where the resources are located are getting poorer and poorer with the resources becoming less and less and the environment getting worse.In the present situation,the benefits of resources exploitation have not been shared.The enterprises of resources exploitation have increased their profits,but the incomes of rural residents in ethnic areas have not been increased,their living conditions have not improved and positions have not been advanced.The resource advantages of ethnic minority areas have not been transformed into regional economic advantages and have not led to the economic development of resource-rich areas.China’s ethnic areas are rich in resources.However,the rich resources in the ethnic areas have not released the region from the paradox of “rich poverty”.Resources exploitation enterprises are just embedded into the ethnic areas,and the relationship with local economic development is not high,the economic development of ethnic areas is still relatively lagging.In addition,with the exploitation of resources,the phenomenon of “resource curse” appeared and social economic problems followed.Therefore,it is one of the important ways to promote the economic and social development of ethnic areas,increase the incomes of compatriots of ethnic groups and enrich the people of all ethnic groups and to develop the resources in ethnic areas through the formulation of a rational game of interest mechanism.This is not only the universal voice of the masses of all ethnic groups,but also the need to achieve sound and rapid development of our national economy.Moreover,in view of the fact that the economic,political and social development of ethnic minority areas is still far from the rest of the country,Article 4 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that “the State should help ethnic minority areas to accelerate their economic and cultural development in accordance with the characteristics and needs of the ethnic minorities.” Article 118 stipulates that “when developing resources and building enterprises in ethnic autonomous areas,the State shall take care of the interests of those areas.” The implementation of this provision in China’s current legal system for the exploitation of resources mainly manifests itself in two aspects.First,the organs of self-government in ethnic autonomous areas are given priority in the exploitation of natural resources.Second,the central government is required to take appropriate measures to accommodate the interests of ethnic autonomous areas and ethnic minorities in the exploitation of natural resources under its leadership.However,seen from the arrangement of the current legal system of resource development in China,the special protection of the rights and interests of ethnic minorities has not been realized.Therefore,a comprehensive and systematic study on the mechanism of the game of interests of natural resources development in ethnic minority areas is significant.Pursuing the rural revitalization strategy is a major decision and deployment made by the 19 th National Congress of the Party,and it is the master of the work of the “agriculture,rural areas and rural people” in the new era.Rural areas in ethnic areas are in the midst of rapid social changes.There is a conflict of interest between the various stakeholders in the reality of the game of resource exploitation interests.Coordinate the interests of various stakeholders so as to provide a stable and harmonious developing environment for rural revitalization.In the resources exploitation,farmers are still in a weak position.Their political rights cannot be fully guaranteed,with the economic interests of farmers also be damaged.This paper theoretically discusses the institutional reasons for the disadvantaged status of farmers,in order to improve their status and give full play to the main role of the peasants in the rural revitalization strategy.The effective rural governance is one of the important goals of the rural revitalization strategy.At the same time,the effective rural governance is one of the important goals of the rural revitalization strategy.Effective rural governance must depend on the specific social norms and the public power subjects that guarantee the operation of these norms.Local government has the imbalance of the role of vacancy and offside in the game of interest in stone material exploitation and has produced a series of negative effects.Therefore,this paper tries to find out the institutional defects of local governments in the game of interest in stone material exploitation,and correctly take a role of local governments in rural governance.This dissertation uses the game theory,with the field investigation case of the game of interest in Yang Shi Miao Zhai stone material exploitation with national characteristics,analysis the distribution of interest in Yang Shi Miao Zhai stone material exploitation;identify the stakeholders and their behavior patterns.Through the analysis of three-parties’ mutual interest and performance of game imbalance of Yang Shi Miao Zhai,stone material exploitation enterprise and local government in the process of stone material exploitation,this paper tries to find out reasons for imbalance of the game.Finally,construct the three-party game model in the game of interest in stone material exploitation and discuss the interest distribution mechanism of stone material exploitation in order to achieve strategic equilibrium.This paper is divided into six chapters.The first chapter is the introduction,which mainly introduces the significance of research background,related research progress,methods and related theories.The second chapter discusses Yang Shi Miao Zhai.Yang Shi Miao Zhai retained its ethnic traditional culture,including excellent family tradition inheritance and the worship of nature.The unique social organization of Yang Shi Miao Zhai,such as the clan system and the Zhai Lao system,together with the villagers’ autonomy system constitute the social organization structure of Yang Shi Miao Zhai.Yang Shi Miao Zhai still retains public ownership economy,which potentially affects the game of interests in the stone material exploitation.The third chapter makes it clear that the game stakeholders in stone material exploitation includes Yang Shi Miao Zhai,stone material exploitation enterprises and local governments etc..Different parties have different pursuits of interests,and thus determine their respective behavior patterns.The forth chapter analyses the game relationship between Yang Shi Miao Zhai and stone material exploitation enterprises,points out the interest game imbalance caused by the negative external effects of stone material exploitation enterprises and discusses the interest game between the two parts in stone material exploitation.The fifth chapter launches the game analysis stone material exploitation between Yang Shi Miao Zhai and local government.It analyses the interaction relationship between the two parts,points out the negative effects of the game and the reasons for the imbalance,and discusses the game of interests between the two parts in the stone material exploitation.In the sixth chapter,a game model is established.It defines the constraint elements of the game,makes clear the characteristics of the game of three parts and analyses the basic orientation of the game of interest.The concluding part seeks to establish a reasonable mechanism of interest game in order to expand the game of interest and achieve a balanced strategy in resources exploitation.