Supply Chain Coordination And Revenue Management With Considering Consumer Behavior

To succeed in heated market competition,a firm should establish and develop long-term interaction relationship with consumers,learn consumer behavior and adopt appropriately effective marketing strategies.Taking into account the interaction between marketing strategies and consumer behavior as well as the impacts of consumer behavior on market demand,this dissertation applies theories of optimal control and differential game to investigate the problem of supply chain coordination and revenue management under different market structures.The main context and contributions are concluded in the following:A problem of determining the optimal dynamic pricing and replenishment cycle for non-instantaneous deteriorating items is studied,where demand is impacted by both price and inventory level.The deteriorating items do not bear deterioration when refreshing,and under such case the inventory depends on consumer demand only;otherwise it is jointly influenced by demand and deterioration.Based on the noninstantaneous deteriorating items inventory changing characters,a profit-maximizing dynamic model is established to derive optimal pricing and replenishment cycle strategies.For the given replenishment cycle,we derive the optimal dynamic pricing strategy by applying Pontryagin's maximum principle,and then design an effective algorithm to obtain the optimal dynamic pricing strategy and replenishment cycle simultaneously.Numerical examples and analysis verify the effectiveness of a proposed algorithm and the impacts analysis of key parameters on optimal strategies and the revenue are provided.A joint pricing and advertising problem for a monopolistic firm over a finite planning horizon is investigated,where demand depends on both the sales price and reference price effect.Positive impacts of the sales price and advertising on the reference price are captured.A dynamic model based on the reference price characters is established to maximize profit,and optimal joint strategy of pricing and advertising investment is generated.Numerical examples are provided to compare the optimal strategy and profit under different conditions.Results hold that dynamic strategies benefit thefirm;also,dynamic pricing and advertising strategies are complementary.A coordination problem of a vertical supply chain which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer is investigated.The manufacturer determines quality investment and nationwide advertising while the retailer decides on local promotion strategy.The strategies of the manufacturer,namely,quality investment and national advertising positively impact goodwill and the reference price whereas the local promotion strategy made by the retailer has negative influence.Equilibrium(optimal)strategies and the corresponding profit under non-cooperative(unilateral collaboration)conditions as well as those of integrated situation are obtained,and the impact of the reference price effect on equilibrium(optimal)strategies are analyzed.Profit comparison under different conditions show: the structure of decentralized supply chain hurts profits of chain members;unilateral collaboration achieves Pareto improvement of the decentralized chain but cannot achieve complete chain coordination;and a mechanism jointly considers revenue sharing and bilateral cooperation contract is able to coordinate the supply chain.A differential game model between a marketing department and manufacturing department of a firm is established,where demand depends on both the sales price and reference price effect.The marketing department aims to maximize its own profit and decides on pricing and advertising investment strategies while the manufacturing department determines the manufacturing strategy to minimize its cost.When both departments can choose to adopt farsighted or myopic behavioral strategy,a selection problem of myopic and farsighted behaviors of game players is investigated.Differential game theory is applied to derive the Nash feedback equilibrium strategies,trajectories and objective functions under different behavior combinations.The myopic or farsighted strategies for both departments are obtained via comparison analysis.