Research On Pricing And Advertising Strategies Of Dual Channel Supply Chain Based On Consumer Perceived Value

With the rapid development of the network and logistics.More and more manufacturers have opened up their network channels and formed a sales system with network and traditional channels coexisting.However,the opening of online channels has brought about channel conflict to traditional channels.At the same time,customer's consuming behavior has also become individualized.Each customer has different perceptions of product value and product cost,and supply chain members can change the product value through cooperative advertising,thereby obtaining customers to win profits and solving channel conflicts.Therefore,based on customer perceived value theory,this paper studies the optimal pricing and best advertising strategies of manufacturers and retailers in this context,and analyzes the influence of related parameters on decision-making and maximised profit,and then gives reasonable advice.Based on customer perceived value theory and channel selection theory,this paper expands the Hotelling segment into a plane to simulate the consumer market and establish a demand model for price and goodwill of dual channel members.The advertising strategy of supply chain members can affect the value of goodwill.By adding the retail advertising to the goodwill of the retailer based on the Nerlove-Arrow classic advertising model,a new dynamic cooperative advertising model is established,and a differential game approach is used.Investigating the optimal decision-making and maximum profit of the manufacturer and retailer in Stackelberg master-slave game and cooperation game,and comparing and analyzing the results of feedback equilibrium under the two game structures.The study finds that in the two games,the manufacturer's optimal pricing is the same,and the retailer's optimal pricing in the cooperative game is equal to the manufacturer's wholesale price in the Stackelberg game,and the optimal pricing is determined by the customer's perceived benefit;Regardless of the manufacturer or the retailer,the advertising investment in the cooperation game is always greater than the advertising investment in the Stackelberg game;the profit of the two depends on the parameter value.