As an important strategic pillar industry of our country,the defence industry is the core field of production and development of high and new technology.However,in the era of globalization,because of the refined social division of labor,the intensification of international competition and the rapid development of modern science and technology,only depends on the power of one military enterprise is not enough to bear the total cost and risk of technology research,also impossible to possess of all the knowledge and technology that innovation required.Collaborative innovation has become the inevitable choice of the defence industry technological innovation.Taking the defence industry collaborative innovation system as the research object,and focusing on the core idea of coordinated development of national defence and economy construction,the dissertation deeply discusses the problem of military enterprises participating in collaborative innovation from the following four aspects: defence industrial chain collaborative innovation mechanism,civil-military integration collaborative innovation system,defence industry-university-research collaborative innovation behavior and defence industry collaborative innovation security framework.The research conclusions reveal the behavior mechanism and strategy choice of the defence industry collaborative innovation system,and analyze the restriction factors and decision mechanism of military enterprises collaborative innovation behavior.Then on that basis,combining with the reality in China,the dissertation further puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions on promoting China’s defence industry collaborative innovation.The innovation points of this dissertation lie in the following aspects:(1)The dissertation builds a differential game model for collaborative innovation mechanism in the defence industrial chain system consisted of a core enterprise and a supporting enterprise.The optimal strategies are solved respectively from the decentralized decision mode without cost sharing,decentralized decision mode with cost sharing and centralized decision mode of cooperation.Then the results under the three kinds of modes are comparatively analyzed through numerical simulation in order to explore the effect of cost sharing and the decision mode of system Pareto optimality.(2)The dissertation builds an evolutionary game model of civil-military integration collaborative innovation to analyze the dynamic evolution process of collaborative innovation behavior between the military enterprises and civilian enterprises.The key factors and influence mechanism of dominating the cooperative innovation behavior are explored.And then the reward and punishment mechanism is put forward to ensure the realization of civil-military integration collaborative innovation,by setting the scene of government reward and punishment contract.(3)The dissertation discusses a problem of technology sharing between a military enterprise and a civilian enterprise in the civil-military integration collaborative innovation system through the differential game model.The optimal strategies and optimal benefits are solved respectively from the Nash non-cooperative game,Stackelberg leader-follower game and coordinated cooperative game.Then the distribution mechanism is provided to realize the coordination of technology sharing behaviors.(4)The dissertation also builds a trilateral game model for governments,enterprises,universities and research institutes to analyze the conditions of industry-university-research collaborative innovation in the field of defence industry.Through investigating the interaction mechanism among them,the process of defence industry-university-research collaborative innovation is revealed,which could guide the government to change the behavior orientation of military enterprises,universities and research institutes by adjusting its functions. |