Public Justification And The Good Life

What happened within contemporary political philosophy can be named as a justificatory turn,because more and more philosophers attempt to answer the question of political legitimacy,which is really fundamental to any political claims,by the project of public justification.Since public justification means the legitimate exercise of political powers should be accepted by each reasonable citizen,those philosophers believe,the state shouldn’t endorse to any conceptions of good life,especially those morally good ones.Therefore,public justification is deemed as an anti-perfectionism project that doesn’t allow the state to appeal to any conceptions of moral good in justifying its action.This dissertation tries to suggest some criticisms against that proposition,and elaborate a new approach to liberal perfectionism under the premise of public justification.The first chapter examines three main theories of public justification,and shows all of them are relied upon the thesis of value pluralism and Rawlsian conception of moral personality in arguing for the anti-perfectionism,which indeed provides some crucial clues for our research.In the second chapter,I firstly argue that the value pluralism doesn’t lead to anti-perfectionism,in contrast,it is compatible with liberal perfectionism;then reveal the project of public justification only presupposes the existence of qualified reasonable citizens that are defined by their good faiths to live together with others,instead of effective reasonable citizens defined by Rawlsian conception of moral personality,so philosophers shouldn’t deny the legitimacy of perfectionism on the basis of Rawlsian conception of moral personality alone.Chapter three analyzes Rawlsian conception of moral personality,and shows it contains two incompatible understandings of human agency,hence is self-defeated.After refuting two grounds of anti-perfectionism,chapter four and chapter five commit to disenchanting another illusion of public justification.i.e.the principle of justificatory neutrality,because the state cannot keep neutral among all conceptions of good life in justifying its actions,given the principle of "ought implies can",justificatory neutrality is also failed.After indicating public justification doesn’t entail the conclusion of anti-perfectionism,the rest chapters begin to elaborate a new approach to perfectionism.In chapter six,I make a defense for the substantial conception of autonomy,and then formulate an autonomous conception of good life in chapter seven,meanwhile,I also explain why reasonable citizens have sufficient reasons to accept such a way of life.That means,given the basic requirement of public justification,the state can exercise its powers under the guidance of personal autonomy,and commits to a perfectionist liberalism.Chapter eight tries to expand the moral foundations of state actions by emphasizing the importance of social morality,which is indispensable to the social cooperation.Since one of the most essential purpose of public justification is to maintain the social cooperation,liberal state can endorse to some certain conceptions of moral good as well.Thus far,a new approach to liberal perfectionism has been established.This approach is not only compatible with the project of public justification,but also more plausible than other claims of liberal perfectionism.This view has been demonstrated in the last chapter.