Research On Equilibrium Strategies Of Competitive Supply Chain With Disruption Risk

With the accelerating process of global economic integration and increasingly fierce market competition, the operating environment and demand situation faced by enterprises become more complicated. In order to reduce maximally uncertainty of own material supply and product demand caused by fierce competition, and to gain a advantage in the fierce market competition, enterprises have come to realize that go-it-alone competition mode in the past has been unable to meet fierce competition of the market demand, we can only develop decision-making from the perspective of competition between supply chain in order to adapt to the market environment with drastic changes. It is not enough for the enterprise to focus on supply chain performance of its own, because neglecting behavior of the rival, decision often deviates from optimal strategy, which can result in failure in competition. Therefore, it is of theoretical and practical significance to study equilibrium strategies for competitive supply chains.In this thesis, based on the summarization and analysis of domestic and international theories and methods of competitive supply chains, supply chain contracts and supply chain disruption risk management, we focus on studying equilibrium strategies of competitive supply chains under disruption risk from operation angle and try to generalize the existing results of supply chain management from single supply chain to two supply chains and from none disruption risk to disruption in horizontal aspect, and from decisions of marketing level to decisions of operation level in vertical aspect. We obtain equilibrium strategies based on different game structures and different channel structures under different disruption environment.By using Nonlinear programming and game theory, under the assumption of symmetry information, on the one hand, game equilibrium models are established for competitive supply chains with demand disruption risk under Nash game between supply chains when two supply chains adopt three different game structures, i.e. supplier-dominant (SS), retailer-dominant (RS) and equal power for supplier and retailer(VN). Equilibrium strategies and its existence conditions under different game structure are given. Equilibrium outcomes are compared with those of models without demand disruption risk to provide theoretical guidance for supply chain managers. On the other hand, related research are extended to models with supply disruption risk under Stackelberg game between supply chains, a corresponding game equilibrium model is established, and equilibrium strategies under different channels structure are further obtained. Further, by exploring dominant strategy of competitive supply chain, Nash equilibrium structures of competitive supply chains are provided under different disruption risks.By applying Nonlinear programming and game theory, under the assumption of incomplete information, equilibrium strategies of competitive supply chains are studied under disruption risk. Corresponding EPEC, MPEC and Nash equilibrium models are constructed under four various supply chain structures including the structures of Decentralization-Decentralization (DD), Decentralization-Integration (DI), Integration-Decentralization (ID), and Integration-Integration (II). Equilibrium strategies under different channels structures are given by using optimization optimal theory. Further, Equilibrium outcomes are compared for four different supply chain structures by numerical examples, and dominant channel structures for competitive supply chain under different disruption risks and effect of disruption risk on dominant structure are provided.By using contract theory, game equilibrium models are established for competitive supply chains under demand disruption risk and supply disruption risk when two supply chains adopt four different contract structures, namely, two supply chains all adapt wholesale-price contract (WW) or revenue-sharing contract (RR) or one adapts wholesale-price contract and the other adapts revenue-sharing contract (RW or WR). Equilibrium strategies under different contract structures are given by using optimization optimal theory. Equilibrium outcomes of four different contract structures are compared by numerical examples, and dominant contracts for competitive supply chains under different disruption risks are given.By taking Gome and Suning household electrical appliances enterprise supply chains as a research object, supply chain competition for the appliance industry is analyzed using method of empirical analysis, data of actual operating are obtained, and the relevant competition data are analyzed and processed. Furthermore, we analyze equilibrium strategies under three various different game structures and four various different channel structures using equilibrium results of competitive supply chain under demand disruption, to provide theoretical support in the face of demand disruption for Gome and Suning supply chains.The research results of paper not only enrich decision theory of supply chain competition and decision theory of supply chains with disruption risk, but also promote the application of the decision models of competitive supply chains, and provide more sufficient scientific evidence for decision makers of supply chain management.