Research On The Job Search Problem Under Uncertain Environment

Job search is the study of the job searcher’s optimal search strategy, min-imum wage and unemployment insurance mechanism design, the existence andefciency of market equilibrium under match friction condition. This dissertationfocuses on the job searcher’s stopping rule and wage contract design problem ofthe employer in diferent uncertain environments. The main points of the disser-tation are as follows.Fixed sample search model and sequential search model in fuzzy setting arediscussed, in which the wage distributions are assumed to be specifed possibilitydistributions. When sampled from the possibility distribution, the ofered wagesare iid fuzzy variables and the fxed sample search leads to totally diferent results.Thus, it is discussed and a result implies that the search times has no relationwith search cost. The sequential search aims to maximize the expected valueof the job searcher when under fuzzy wage ofer environment, via theoreticalanalysis the corresponding reservation wage rule and its computing formula isdevised, meanwhile, the afect of mean preserving spread to reservation wage isalso discussed.Sequential search model with risk tolerance is built, in which the job searcheris assumed to sample from a fnite job ofer set and the sampled wage ofers arenot deterministic numbers but wage distributions. Risk tolerance, reservationwage and its impacts on expected value and average search times are studied toprovide meaningful suggestions and theoretical foundation.A novel job search model based on random search and wage ofers are fuzzyvariables is investigated, to decide whether accept the ofer or not, the credibilitymeasure and the expected value criterion are proposed by using credibility theory.Due to the riskiness involved in the decision scheme, average chance of the jobsearcher’s real wage no less than reservation wage is pursued and objectives underthe two stopping rule are discussed.A job search model in labor market under incomplete information is present- ed. To optimize the employer’s welfare by designing wage contract, a discrimina-tion model with incentive compatibility constraint and participation constraintis constructed. Through theoretical analysis, the crisp equivalent form of the pri-mary model is obtained and the necessary condition is given. Furthermore, thewage contract design problem under uncertain environment is solved by variationmethod and the optimal solution is discussed.