Study On Compensation Mechanism Of Quality And Safety Of Agricultural Products In China

The quality safety (QS) of agricultural products has been a significant social issue, which hasaroused widely concern. This article analyzed producers’ quality selection behavior in depth witheconomics correlation theory, elaborated the necessity of compensation mechanism on QS ofagricultural products. Finally, this article designed compensation system for China’s QS production ofagricultural products based on the analysis of foreign management experience. Major research contentsand conclusions are as follows:(1)Analyze the current situation of China’s agri-food QS production and management, as long asthe experience from other countries. This article pointed out the pitfalls of QS production and thedeficiencies of management of China’s agri-food: serious situation of agricultural ecologicalenvironment; weak QS consciousness of producers, low level of production organizing; incompletesystem; lack of high level design of government management, insufficient and decentralized investment.This article also summarized the advanced experience and inspirations of developed countries.(2) Using the game theory and other relevant theories, this article systematically explained qualityselection behavior of producers under information asymmetry environment. Based on different divisionsof production goals, this article constructs the game models among producers and producers, producersand regulators, regulators in different areas, which showed: producers generally expect their peers toproduce products with good quality so as to increase market price, however, they themselves prefer toproduce products with poor quality in order to obtain super profit. The probability for producers toselect products with good quality is influenced by high cost of government regulation and smallpunishment, therefore, the probability for them to choose products with good quality is small. Localgovernment is restrained by government performance examination and finance, and expects to take afree rider from excellent performance of QS production of agricultural products in other areas.(3)Employ the Decision Tree model to analyze the encouragement effect of implementingagri-food QS production compensation on quality selection behavior of producers. This articleconcluded that via applying agri-food QS production quality, the income of producing ’inferior goods’would be less than the income of producing QS agri-food, which would raise the enthusiasm ofproducers’ QS production. Meanwhile, QS production compensation on agricultural organizedproduction could lead the farmers to participate in the organized production.(4) Using the method of the Logit model to analyze the quality selection willingness of farmers andaffecting factors of QS production of agricultural products. The result of model shows, it is the farmers’level of education, level of income, the production cost of the QS production and cognitive level offarmers. It is sure to effectively improve the willingness among farmers to produce safe agriculturalproducts with the constantly improved farmers’ education level, increased subsidy for pesticide andveterinary medicine with high efficient and low poison residuals, strengthened relevant training onfarmers and guidance in markets.(5) Construct the agricultural products’ QS compensation system in China systematically. Thearticle designed the basic framework of compensation system, including target, principle, object, extent, method and standard. This article analyzed the implications and features of government compensation,market compensation and cross compensation and designed the compensation process and theorganization and management of compensation. Finally, this article put forward relevant safeguards inorganization, institution, technology, capital and so on.