The Research On Chinese Local Fiscal Expenditure Structure Bias

In recent years, competition for growth of the biggest price than the fiscal decentralization in the course of the decline of the efficiency of local public goods supply. In order to pursue the term "growth maximization", local officials in financial expenditure arrangements exhibit different attention, its behavior through fiscal expenditure structure can be the most direct and objective embodiment. Much more worrying is that, since the tax sharing system, the structure of local fiscal expenditure has been a systematic bias, and this bias is not with economic development and system reform and the correct sign, instead continue to maintain a rigid locking state. Obviously, this bias state on the local economic development and system reform steadily brought serious harm. This article mainly from the multiplier effect, crowding-out effect and Matthew effect in three dimensions depict the fiscal expenditure structure bias to macroscopical economy caused by the negative impact.Based on the above understanding, this article attempts through theoretical analysis and empirical research to seek the cause of local fiscal expenditure structure deviation reasons. From the macro point of view, we study the Chinese fiscal federalism bring decentralization cost; but, from microcosmic on, what we want to do is from internal point of view to understand the formation of the internal mechanism of fiscal expenditure structure. On one hand, based on the new classical economics perspective, using the theoretical model analysis makes us understand the financial competition behind the economic mechanism and theory of essence in order to clarify the financial competition and the intrinsic link between the structure of public expenditure. Through the measurement model of the empirical test, we find that, although in the present our country did not improve the transfer payment system and the household registration system in the different extent influence fiscal competition effectively thereby causing the public expenditure structure bias, but in the long run fiscal competition for the improvement of the structure of public expenditure is dynamic and effective. On the other hand, from the perspective of new political economics in China, we find that type of yardstick competition drive below, local officials self-interest behavior is the direct cause of fiscal expenditure structure bias:private rational amplification caused the fiscal expenditure structure bias, public rationality loss led to the fiscal expenditure structure bias curing. If the yardstick competition the negative consequences of more general understanding, so the research object is the government governance. Through the argumentation, we found that the structure of public expenditure by the government governance quality endogenously determined.In order to further improve the local government fiscal expenditure structure, we must from the three aspects of optimizing management. First of all, the promotion of local government fiscal competition among the effective implementation. The causes of low efficiency of fiscal competition on the reality of the lack of system. So, if we can further the reform of census register system to administer interval population to flow, then the effective financial competition can make the structure of fiscal expenditure efficiency to be improved. In addition, if the central increase special transfer payment can make up local government fiscal expenditure structure, so as to ensure that the citizens enjoy the lowest public service. Secondly, to improve the quality of management of local government. Our country already from survival type society to the development of society, therefore., on one hand the government must pay full attention to the all-round development of people, pay close attention to and meet the social member’s basic public demand, therefore, it needs the government change management mode, quick to public service oriented government transformation, to build a citizen as the center of the local governance; on the other hand, central also must pass through the improvement and perfection of Promotion Tournament mechanism in order to realize the local officers transformation. Finally, the perfect local public expenditure supervision mechanism. As a result of public expenditure often appears in the process of incomplete information and asymmetric information, the resulting principal-agent relationship exists. In order to prevent the agent’s adverse selection and moral risk, effective financial supervision mechanism and increase the financial transparency information disclosure system is the realization of open finance the establishment of public finance is an effective way to.This paper consists of seven chapters. The first chapter of introduction, including research background and significance of topics, the subjects in the study were defined, and the related domestic and foreign classical literature review. Put forward the research methods and specific train of thought, and the basic framework of research and content undertook be generalizinged simply. The second chapter is the local fiscal expenditure structure bias on1997-2009investigation, local fiscal expenditure structure are analyzed. The third chapter is the local fiscal expenditure structure bias macroeconomic effects, mainly from the multiplier effect, crowding-out effect and Matthew effect in three dimensions to describe the structure of fiscal expenditure bias to macroscopical economy caused by the negative impact. The fourth chapter is based on the research of new classical economics perspective, using the theoretical model analysis makes us understand the financial competition behind the economic mechanism and theory of essence in order to clarify the financial competition and the intrinsic link between the structure of public expenditure. The fifth chapter from the new political economics perspective, we found in Chinese type yardstick competition drive below, local officials self-interest behavior is the direct cause of fiscal expenditure structure bias, then from a more general theoretical analysis, discusses the structure of public expenditure by the government is endogenously determined by the quality of governance. The sixth chapter mainly from promoting fiscal competition among local governments, improving local government management and improve the quality of local public expenditure supervision mechanism to study three aspects of optimization of structure of local fiscal expenditure management mechanism. The seventh chapter combining the relevant theories and empirical results, the optimization of structure of local fiscal expenditure and improve local government governance quality and puts forward some policy suggestions.