| China’s four state-owned banks have long been troubled by poor asset quality and low profitability. The cause of inefficiency in state-owned banks lies in its single property rights. Because state-owned property right is impersonal, so it is unable to safeguard its own interests in the game between the owner and operator in state-owned bank, which leading to internal control in state-owned bank.From1978to2003, the process of state-owned banks reform in China can be divided into three phases:recovery and establishment of specialized state banks; enterprise-management of specialized state banks; state-owned commercial banks reform. The measures taken in this period played a role in improving China’s banking system, increasing competition in banking market. However, as these reform measures had not touch on state-owned bank’s property rights, so the reform effect is not significant. In the new round of reform in state-owned banks, the eye-catching feature is beginning to change the single property right system. In the reform, the four state-owned banks basically adopted the same "Three Steps" model:financial restructuring-governance reform-listing in capital market.This article firstly makes an qualitative analysis on the effect of state-owned banks reform in2003-2010from the point of property rights and corporate governance. At the aspect of property right reform, four state-owned banks change from state-owned enterprises with single property right into corporations with diversification property rights, but the ownership structure of state-holding also makes some hazard to the improving of performance in four banks. The reform in2003-2010attaches great importance to the construction of corporate governance, regarding the building of bank corporate governance as the core of the reform. After the reform, the four state-owned banks have been established a sound corporate governance in form, and modern corporate governance mechanism is in initial operational. But the operating of governance is determined by property rights structure. As state-owned bank have not solve the problem in property rights,corporate governance in state-owned bank is just similar in form with modern corporate governance. The reform attaches great importance to corporate governance, to build good Banking Company corporate governance as the core of state-owned bank reform.After the reform, the four major state-owned banks are in reference to the international advanced banks established form complete corporate governance structure of Modern Corporation governance, initially started functioning.But the company governance in property right structure, derived from the company owners and operators between the interests of the game.But so far, China’s state-owned banks is not completely solve the problem of buy of empty of owners, resulting in China’s state-owned banks corporate governance mechanism inherent power is insufficient,"shape" and "miraculous".The paper then makes an empirical analysis with the use of financial index analysis and DEA model on the effect of reform in state-owned banks makes an empirical analysis. In the fifth chapter, paper make a test on the financial date of four state-owned bank after the reform with seven indicators in3categories stipulated by CBRC. We found that four state-owned banks achieved the target set by CBRC. In the sixth chapter of this paper, we use a DEA model to make empirical analysis on the effect of state-owned bank reform. It is showed that the average technical efficiency of four state-owned banks is higher than that of joint-stock commercial banks. But when technology efficiency is further decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency, we found that although the average technical efficiency of state-owned bank is higher than that of joint-stock commercial banks, but the average pure technical efficiency of state-owned bank is lower than that of joint-stock bank, so the high level of technical efficiency of state-owned bank is mainly caused by its high scale efficiency.In following paper, we talk about two controversial issues in the reform of state-owned banks:the role of Huijin Company in state-owned banks reform and the effectiveness of introducing foreign strategic investors in reform. The seventh chapter analyzes the role of Huijin Company in state-owned banks reform effect. The positive effects Huijin Company played in reform includes:SAFE’s foreign exchange injection enriches the capital of the state-owned banks,ensure the smooth progress of reform. SAFE exercise the functions of investor on behalf of State, thereby reducing the insiders controlling problems in state-owned bank. But SAFE is not endowed all right of investor. The eighth chapter analyzes the effectiveness of introducing foreign strategic investors in state-owned bank reform. The introduction of foreign strategic investors has played a positive role in state-owned banks’successful listing in overseas capital markets; the aims that learn advanced international banking management experience, and that improve corporate governance have not being reached.The achievements of the reform are as following:property right was successfully diversified; form a sound corporate governance structure, modern corporate governance mechanism is initially in function; construction of the inner-control mechanism is strengthened, and risk prevention system is constantly improved; State-owned banks ’scale and performance are enhanced quickly, the finance position obtain a fundamental improvement. Shortcomings of the reform include:state shares is still on position of absolute control, the problem of owner’s impersonality in state-owned banks has not been fundamentally resolved; Bank s have built a formally sound corporate governance structure, but the governance mechanisms are not yet operating effectively.China’s state-owned bank reform is still in its infancy, and there is still a big gap compared with the advanced international banks. As for Property rights reform in state-owned banks, the following task is to further diversify the property rights structure. According to China’s gradual reform principles, the release of state-owned shares should be a slow process. The first step is to change the current state absolute control into state relative majority in shares. After the conditions are ripen, we can consider selecting one or two state-owned banks to try giving up state’s controlling position. In future, the four banks could not be controlled by foreign capital in stock, can only be controlled by domestic private capital. When domestic private capital holds a commercial bank, the key is to improve banking supervision capacity. |
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